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The attention that SARS created in 2003 has influenced public and political 
perceptions about the risks associated with infectious diseases and the role the public 
health system should play in national security.  This comparative case study was 
conducted to examine the Canadian public health’s system response to SARS in order to 
formulate recommendations for the U.S. public health system.  This analysis 
demonstrated that the governmental organizational structure of the U.S. public health 
system does not support its current mission or its new responsibilities for public health 
security.   
A national public health system is needed to support dual missions: the traditional 
mission of tailoring public health programs specific to the social and demographic needs 
of the citizens; and the new mission of public health security.  In order to transform the 
current U.S. public health system into a national public health system two critical 
components must be addressed at the federal, state, and local level: 1) organizational 
capacity and 2) service delivery.  Recommendations are provided regarding the way 
forward at the federal level and work needing to be done at the state and local level 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND   
Emerging and reemerging infectious diseases have plagued human populations 
throughout history.1  From some of the earliest recorded epidemics of bubonic plague and 
smallpox to the deadly 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic, infectious diseases have shaped a 
significant part of public health practice.  The terrorist attacks on the United States in 
2001 and subsequent anthrax-laden letters sent through the U.S. Postal Service propelled 
public health into the rank and file of the “first responder community.”2  Likewise, the 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003 confirmed the need to 
ensure the nation’s public health system has the capacity to prevent, detect, respond to, 
and manage outbreaks of infectious disease. 
In the first few years of the twenty-first century, the anthrax attacks, SARS, and 
the threat of another pandemic demonstrate how the world is changing in terms of 
vulnerability to health threats.  Concerns about the U.S. public health system’s 
preparedness for epidemics and disasters have been elevated.  According to a World 
Health Organization (WHO) 2007 report, SARS confirmed fears generated by the 
bioterrorism threat that a new or unfamiliar pathogen would have profound national and 
international implications for global public health security.  SARS provides proof that 
infectious diseases are a national and international public health threat.  In order to 
address these threats, the public health system must have adequate capacity and 
capability to reduce morbidity and mortality from infectious diseases either naturally 
occurring or intentionally introduced.  The attention that SARS prompted has influenced 
public and political perceptions about the risks associated with infectious diseases and the 
                                                 
1 Donald F. Thompson et al., “The Bug Stops Here: Force Protection and Emerging Infectious 
Diseases,” (Washington, DC, National Defense University, 2005), 
http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/Def_Tech/DTP%2021%20Bug%20Stops%20Here.pdf (accessed July 20, 
2007). 
2 For the purpose of this thesis, the “first responder community” refers to law enforcement, hazardous 
materials (HAZMAT) teams, firefighters, emergency medical services and emergency management. 
2 
 
role the public health system should play in homeland security.  SARS highlights the fact 
that emerging infectious diseases know no boundaries; thus, the threat is global. 
Challenges faced by Canada’s public health system during the SARS response 
and the threat of pandemic influenza have raised questions about the ability of the U.S. 
public health system to lead efforts in ensuring national public health security.  
According to a 2004 fact sheet from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS), public health systems are better prepared for terrorism and natural disasters.  
States have mass vaccination plans in place, reportable disease detection systems, and 
plans for receiving assets from the Strategic National Stockpile.3  Substantial investments 
have been made since 2002, in excess of $7 billion, to increase America’s ability to 
prepare for and respond to public health emergencies.4  Despite these investments, efforts 
thus far may be yielding less progress than anticipated, and it continues to be unclear 
whether the U.S. public health system is prepared for natural occurring epidemics or 
bioterrorism.5  Its capacity and capability to provide national public health security is 
being called into question.   
Governmental public health is intrinsically a network of local, state, and federal 
agencies that are collectively responsible for disease prevention, response, and control in 
America.  Governmental roles and responsibilities for these agencies have evolved 
throughout history.  These agencies emerged several decades ago to provide basic 
community services, including collecting vital statistics, prevention services (e.g., well-
child care), and the promotion of health education and healthy life styles.  In addition, 
these services included ensuring clean drinking water, sanitation, and prevention and 
control of diseases.  The focus of traditional public health practice is at the community 
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), “HHS Fact Sheet: Biodefense 
Preparedness – Record of Accomplishments,” http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040428.html 
(accessed August 9, 2007). 
4 DHHS, “HHS Announces $896.7 Million in Funding to States for Public Health Preparedness and 
Emergency Response,” news release, July 17, 2007, 
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2007pres/07/pr20070717c.html (accessed, September 6, 2007). 
5 Nicole Lurie et al., “Conceptualizing and Defining Public Health Emergency Preparedness,” 
American Journal of Public Health 97, no. 1 (2007): S9. 
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level and aimed at the population.  The practice must be flexible in order to deal with 
specific community health needs which may be different from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
According to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 2003:   
The concept of a “public health system”—a complex network of 
individuals and organizations that, when working together, can represent 
“what we as a society do collectively to assure the conditions in which 
people can be healthy.”6  
Thousands of local, state, and federal agencies participate in public health practice 
and are governed independently by varying degrees of authority.  This nation’s public 
health agencies are products of federalism—a system of government in which power is 
distributed between a central authority and the constituent units—and act on the orders of 
boards at the local level, governors at the state level, and primarily secretaries at the 
federal level.7  Public health is primarily the responsibility of the state.  The Tenth 
Amendment enunciates plenary power retained by the states: “The powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or the people.”8   
Public health practice is governed by administrative and bureaucratic realities, 
meaning that programs are influenced and shaped by their political context.  The 
translation of plans into action requires a great deal of perseverance and negotiating skill 
and, if successful, comes with varying degrees of support in terms of funding and 
infrastructure.  As political alliances rise and fall so does public health.  In essence, 
public health is not defined by what the profession is capable of doing; instead, it is 
driven by decisions made by a political system within a jurisdiction.9 
                                                 
6 Institute of Medicine (IOM), introduction to The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century 
(Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2003), xiv.  
7 Elin Gursky, “Epidemic Proportions: Building National Public Health Capabilities to Meet National 
Security Threats,” http://homelandsecurity.org/journal/Epidemic_Proportions_2.pdf (accessed July 26, 
2008), 1. 
8 U.S. Constitution, amend. 10, http://www.uscontitution.net/xconst_Am10.html (accessed August 1, 
2008).  
9 IOM, The Future of Public Health, (Washington, DC, National Academy Press, 1988): 4.  
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The shaping of public health occurs as a result of the health problems needing to 
be addressed in a particular community and by the political system within which it 
functions.  Success is largely dependent upon “bottom-up” support.  It is at that local 
level that an understanding of how programs should function and what resources are 
necessary to address particular health needs are realized.  Since health problems are often 
addressed at the local level under varying degrees of political support, the scope and scale 
of capacity and capability of public health varies widely.   
Today, public health is at center stage and is being summoned to take on a new 
mission—that is, a national public health security mission—while maintaining its 
traditional focus.  The new mission is placing unprecedented demands upon an already 
weak and fragmented system.  A system that the IOM described in 1988 as disorganized, 
having weak and unstable leadership, outdated statutes, inadequate financial support, and 
lack of effective links between public and private sectors.  Much has changed in public 
health since 1988, including progress in the science of improving health at the population 
level, emergence of public-private partnerships, and more recently, an influx of 
investments for bioterrorism preparedness.  What has nott changed is the fact that the 
nation’s public health system remains fragile, leaving the health of the nation vulnerable 
due to outdated health information systems and technologies, an insufficient trained 
public health workforce, antiquated laboratory facilities, a lack of epidemiological 
surveillance systems, and incomplete domestic preparedness and emergency response 
capacity.10  
Under the new mission for public health, the present situation is one of multiple 
federal, state, and local agencies responding in multiple ways to an excess of planning 
information for public health and homeland security.  This information is coming from 
policy makers, governmental agencies, academicians, and non-profit organizations.  In 
October 2007, the president released Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-21 
establishing a National Strategy for Public Health and Medical Preparedness, which 
outlined requirements for governmental public health.  This directive came after the 
                                                 
10 IOM, The Future of the Public’s Health in the 21st Century, 3. 
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released fifteen national planning scenarios in 
2004 and the Target Capabilities List: A Companion to the National Preparedness Goal in 
2006 for use in emergency planning.  In addition, there are requirements for compliance 
with the national incident management system and for meeting cooperative agreement 
grant requirements for funding released annually by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), and 
the DHS.  All this information and associated requirements create numerous challenges 
for public health leaders in addressing its new mission.  Public health is faced with 
changing federal mandates, shifts in local, state, and federal responsibilities, varying 
funding patterns, and dramatic, and at times, rapid changes in planning and programmatic 
direction coming from policy makers.  These challenges may not be much different from 
what other governmental agencies face; however, they are further compounded given 
public health’s history of evolution and its current system infrastructure.  
Dealing with these complex challenges creates confusion and inefficiencies in 
addressing fundamental public health system needs.  The current workforce capacity for 
preparedness can barely address day-to-day program planning necessary to ensure that 
federal funding guidance and performance measures are met.  This leads to the inability 
of public health to address overarching system weaknesses.  Multiple agencies in a 
fragmented system responding to a plethora of information contribute to the confusion 
and inefficiency in preparedness.  This may be related to the contradictory nature of some 
of the information leading to frequent shifting of priorities, program objectives, 
performance metrics, and resource allocations.  It may also be due to the complexity of 
prevention and response planning for the catastrophic consequences of an infectious 
disease epidemic, pandemic, or bioterrorism.  
This information and more is used by public health for preparedness.  Yet there is 
little being done to address the very system that is needed to accomplish both the 





health of this nation.  Given the prominence of public health today, it is time to reassess 
the system’s infrastructure and resources to ensure that the full spectrum of 
responsibilities can be met. 
A key factor in dealing successfully with future public health crises is a robust 
and sustainable public health system.  Coordination of prevention and response activities, 
along with strong linkages among multiple partners, are integral in public health 
preparedness.  The ability of the public health system to contain an infectious disease 
epidemic is dependent upon the capacity to do so at every jurisdictional level.  This 
means that the public health system is only as strong as the weakest jurisdiction in the 
system.  Evidence of actual and potential harm to the health of the public from 
weaknesses in the public health system has been mounting, but may not have been clearly 
recognized until the SARS epidemic.  SARS, coupled with the threat of bioterrorism and 
another pandemic, has catalyzed the need for a national public health system. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The problem is threefold: first, the public health system evolved organizationally 
to serve the population-health of communities, not to coordinate the health security of the 
nation; second, the current public health system has been neglected for decades, leaving it 
ill equipped and undertrained to fill its new national security mission; and third, 
governance for public health is primarily local, meaning that agencies follow orders of 
governors and boards, not national plans.  Preparing the U.S. public health system for its 
new mission of national security poses extensive and complex challenges for a fragile, ill-
prepared and ill-equipped system that was never envisioned or organized to take on this 
level of responsibility.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTION  
How can the lessons learned from the Canadian SARS response be applied toward 
developing a national public health system in the United States? 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
The intent of the literature review was to identify current knowledge about the 
public health system’s organizational evolution and its roles and responsibilities in 
prevention, detection, response, and control of infectious diseases in the United States 
and Canada.  Specifically in Canada, this included a comprehensive review of the SARS 
epidemic in 2003 and subsequent governmental response.  Also completed was an 
examination of infrastructure, resources, and funding for governmental public health.  In 
addition, the author aimed at identifying critical system components needed for the public 
health system to meet the new challenge of national public health security.  For the 
purposes of this review, the literature has been divided into three sub-groups, consisting 
of: 1) academic literature, 2) governmental reports and policy documents, and 3) 
professional literature produced by the non-profit sector.   
A review of current and past literature reveals a significant amount of information 
in the area of public health history and its evolution covering preventive and promotional 
health, infectious disease prevention and control, and chronic diseases.  Although not 
abundant, there are several academic studies regarding governmental public health 
system infrastructure and funding spanning local, state, and federal governments.  
Governmental public health preparedness guidance documents, emergency plans, and 
strategies are plentiful.  In addition, there are a number of presidential directives and 
executive orders relating to the role of public health in homeland security.  There is a 
significant amount of literature available covering SARS in general and the epidemic in 
Canada, including science-based, peer-reviewed and governmental reports, as well as 
textbooks.  There is, however, sparse research and little available peer-reviewed literature 
that address the components or infrastructure needed for a national public health system 
capable of ensuring national security.   
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2. Academic Literature 
There is extensive literature focusing on public health from its origin, to its 
organization, and changing roles and responsibilities throughout history.  Niyi Awofeso 
describes six major approaches to public health practice. They are: 1) health protection 
mediated through social structures, 2) public sanitation, 3) contagion control, 4) 
preventive medicine, 5) primary health care, and 6) health promotion.11  Public health 
now faces a new era of preparedness and national security.  Academic literature regarding 
public health in a national security role is limited.  There are a number of articles citing 
challenges for public health in meeting this new mission given its current fragile 
structure, traditional missions, and historical roots in federalism.  
In Laurie Garrett’s book, Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public 
Health, she portrays extraordinary examples and facts regarding national and 
international public health and the need for developing effective public health systems.  
As well, Thomas Abraham in Twenty First Century Plague: The Story of SARS (2004) 
contributes to an understanding of the “politics and economics of disease,” focusing on 
how SARS was fought in China and at the global level. 
SARS is covered extensively in the academic literature.  Comprehensive studies 
have been conducted revealing a great deal of the science behind disease origin, 
transmission, and serological and antibody testing.  The emergence of the disease and 
ensuing epidemic in China, Canada, and a number of other countries has been analyzed.  
In addition, a significant number of epidemiological studies have been conducted.  All of 
this evidence is critical in identifying the infrastructure needs in order to ensure that the 
public health system is prepared to detect, respond to, and manage an infectious disease 
epidemic, whether it is naturally occurring or intentionally introduced. 
Given the substantial investments made by the federal government since 2002 to 
upgrade public health and health care preparedness,12 it is only reasonable to expect 
                                                 
11 Niyi Awofeso, “What’s New About the ‘New Public Health’? American Journal of Public Health, 
94, no. 5 (May 2004): 705.  
12 DHHS, “HHS Announces $896.7 Million in Funding.” 
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policy makers and the public to ask if these investments have created a more prepared 
public health system.  A challenge does exist, however; there is little agreement about 
what actually constitutes public health preparedness or how it should be measured.13  The 
literature and evidence base for public health preparedness, being such a new field, has 
been described as “scant at best.”14  
Over the last four decades, the academic community has offered a variety of 
insights into strategy formation and strategic management.  More recognizable to leaders 
in homeland security and public health is the literature spanning the study of 
organizations on leadership,  political science on public policy making, management for 
business, and the military on strategies of conflict.  The field of strategy is enormous, as 
is the body of literature that provides a great deal of knowledge on strategy. 
Making sense of and understanding strategy from the vast body of literature is a 
challenge. However, Henry Mintzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand, and Joseph Lampel in Strategy 
Safari: A Guided Tour Through the Wilds of Strategic Management provide an overview 
of ten “schools of thought” on strategy formation as well as ideas about strategy itself.15  
The work does not, however, identify a solution for the “best” strategy or a strategy that 
could be described as “one size fits all.”  Rather, the work provides a tool kit inclusive of 
ten schools of thought on strategy, allowing for a more balanced view of the field.  The 
literature on strategy also points out that even though the concept of strategy may be 
rooted in stability, much of the study of strategy focuses on change.16 Public health 
preparedness is a new and complex field and the environment surrounding preparedness 
changes often.  Gaining knowledge about strategy formation will contribute to a greater 
understanding of strategy use in achieving national public health security. 
                                                 
13 Steven M. Asch et al., “A Review of Instruments Assessing Public Health Preparedness,” Public 
Health Reports, 120, no. 5 (September-October 2005): 539. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Henry Mintzberg et al., Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour Through The Wilds of Strategic 
Management (New York: Free Press, 1998), 3. 
16 Ibid., 18. 
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3. Governmental Reports and Policy Documents 
There are a number of governmental reports, documents and policy directives in 
the literature relating to homeland security and public health preparedness.  The recently 
released HSPD-21 that establishes a National Strategy for Public Health and Medical 
Preparedness is intended to “transform our national approach to protecting the health of 
the American people against all disasters.”17  In November 2005, the Homeland Security 
Council released the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, which identified three 
main pillars of the strategy: preparedness and communication; surveillance and detection; 
and response and containment.18  Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, 
issued in 2003, provides for the development of a “new” National Response Plan.19  The 
purpose of this directive is to establish a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to 
domestic incident management for prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.20   
All of these policy documents provide varying degrees of, and at times 
conflicting, direction on priorities for homeland security and public health preparedness.  
What is missing in this sub-literature group is information addressing public health 
system issues including the necessary capacity and capability to address national security.  
Also missing is the foundation upon which to develop these directives; that is, identifying 
what constitutes public health preparedness. 
Despite many new legislative initiatives, public health preparedness has in part 
been driven since early 2002 by the DHHS annual grant requirements and guidelines for 
public health and hospital preparedness.  This includes criteria for plan development,  
 
                                                 
17 President, Directive, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-21,” The White House, 
October 18, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071018-10.html (accessed October 
19, 2007).  
18 Homeland Security Council, “National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza,” 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/federal/index.html#national (accessed November 11, 2007). 
19 President, Directive, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5,” The White House, 
February 28, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html (accessed August 
12, 2008), 281. 
20 President, Plan, “National Response Plan,” The White House, December 2004, 
http://www.scd.state.hi.us/documents/nrp.pdf (accessed August 13, 2008), 1-426. 
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performance evaluation, and reporting.  It is this literature that provides the guidance for 
public health preparedness planning.  Funding is tied to many requirements and 
performance metrics. 
The CDC and ASPR provide preparedness program guidance and performance 
measure requirements based on legislation in the form of benchmarks to build 
infrastructure capacity.  In 2003, both agencies began transitioning from measuring 
capacity (e.g., staffing) to assessing capability (e.g., response times).21  There is no 
shortage of performance measures; however, the literature reveals that most instruments 
used have relied on subjective or structural measures, lacked scientific evidence for the 
measures assessed, or failed to define clearly what entity was responsible for 
accomplishing the task.22 
Retired Colonel Randall J. Larsen in Our Own Worst Enemy (2007) provides an 
enlightening examination of key issues that contribute to national security and submits 
that the two greatest threats to U.S. national security are nuclear and biological threats.  
There are excellent examples of why the government is not prepared to help in the time 
of crisis and he specifically addresses the need for national public health security. 
Additional public health preparedness practice research is needed to build a 
scientific evidence base for performance outcomes.  This will be vital as the public health 
system continues to mature in its new homeland security role.  Outside of anecdotal 
reports, the literature is silent on evidence that the public health system is better prepared 
to respond to catastrophic disasters or terrorism.   
As can be seen from this portion of the literature review, there have been a 
number of governmental attempts to guide public health preparedness planning, strategy 
development, and program evaluation. These attempts contribute to confusion, frequent 
programmatic changes, performance measure changes and resource allocation shifting.  
                                                 
21 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Public Health and Hospital Emergency Preparedness 
Programs: Evolution of Performance Measurement Systems to Measure Progress, (Washington, DC: 
GAO, 2007), 10. 
22 Asch et al., “A Review of Instruments Assessing Public Health Preparedness,” 532. 
12 
 
All of this is occurring while the public and policy makers continue to call for assurances 
that the public health system is prepared.  Public health preparedness planning, as 
indicated in the literature, appears to be driven primarily by federal funding requirements 
and political influences instead of gaining a common understanding of what basic system 
components and infrastructure is necessary to achieve public health preparedness and 
adequate health security for the nation.   
There were a number of governmental reports published in Canada before and 
after SARS that address the state of public health and the need for revitalization of the 
system.  Four major reports that provide key insights into the weaknesses in Canada’s 
public health system and lessons to be learned from SARS were critically reviewed.  One 
report was published prior to SARS and three following the epidemic.  The reports 
include: 1) The Health of Canadians—The Federal Role, the final report on the state of 
the health care system in Canada by the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs 
Science and Technology, chaired by the Honorable Michael J. L. Kirby, October 2002;  
2) Learning from SARS: Renewal of Public Health in Canada, a report of the National 
Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, chaired by Dr. David Naylor, Dean of 
Medicine at the University of Toronto, October 2003;  3) For The Public’s Health: A 
Plan of Action, the final report of the Ontario Expert Panel on SARS and Infectious 
Disease Control, chaired by Dr. David Walker, Dean, Faculty of Health Sciences and 
Director of School of Medicine, Queen’s University, April 2004; and 4) SARS and Public 
Health in Ontario, interim report of the SARS Commission, chaired by the Honorable 
Mr. Justice Archie Campbell, April 2004.   
These four reports contribute significantly to understanding the many challenges 
faced by public health and health care workers during the SARS epidemic.  They provide 
a chronological series of events that took place as SARS emerged and the public health 
and health care system responded.  As well, these reports outline many of the challenges 
faced by a public health system that was ill prepared and ill equipped to deal with an 
infectious disease epidemic.  Recommendations for improvement are made in the reports 
and the response by the Canadian government is tracked.   
13 
 
Unlike the abundance of literature in the way of governmental reports on SARS, 
limited literature on the public health system in Canada is available, primarily because 
prior to SARS, no public health agency for the country existed.  There was, however, a 
public health branch in the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care (OMHLTC).  
Primary focus in Canada at the time of SARS was health care.   
4. Literature from Non-profit Organizations and Professional 
Associations  
Also important as a basis for this research are congressional testimonies, reports 
and publications by non-profit organizations and professional associations.  These 
documents outline recommendations for public health preparedness infrastructure, 
strategy development, funding priorities, evaluation, and identification of preparedness 
gaps that remain unfulfilled.  More notable are reports provided by the IOM on the future 
of public health (1988 and 2003), pandemic influenza planning, and reports regarding 
infectious disease.  Additionally, testimonies, studies, and reports prepared by the RAND 
Corporation provide assessments of public health emergency preparedness, identification 
of barriers in performance, and inadequate accountability systems.  The Association of 
State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) and the National Association of County 
and City Health Officials (NACCHO) likewise present a number of reports on local and 
state public health system organization, infrastructure, and funding.  In addition, both 
organizations provide survey data on public health workforce and survey results on state 
and local public health preparedness strategies, plans, and evaluation methodologies. 
RAND provides several articles and testimonies pressing the need for a clear 
definition of public health preparedness, what public health preparedness requires, and 
who is involved in public health preparedness.23  According to one RAND study, the 
absence of a clear definition of public health preparedness presents challenges to public 
health leaders.  These challenges include: 1) an inability to determine if the nation is 
better prepared to respond to bioterrorism or natural disasters, 2) the continued struggle  
 
                                                 
23 Lurie et al., “Conceptualizing and Defining Public Health Emergency Preparedness,” S9–S11. 
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by policy makers to prioritize investments, and 3) the inability to ensure adequate 
investments without a commonly applied framework for developing standards and 
metrics to evaluate performance outcomes.   
ASTHO and NACCHO on the other hand, provide a series of surveys and issue 
briefs claiming that the investments in public health preparedness at the state and local 
level have yielded some improvements in infrastructure capacity to respond to terrorism 
and catastrophic disasters, yet more needs to be done.  ASTHO released the results of a 
survey in a February 2006 publication titled, Public Health Preparedness: How Do We 
Measure Success?  Several common themes emerged behind the reasons for state public 
health agencies reaching beyond the performance requirements set by CDC.  States are 
searching for “utilitarian mechanisms” to bring greater consistency across federal grant 
requirements and ensure that performance measurements become a routine function of 
preparedness programs.24   
The results of this survey and others similar to it identify some lessons learned.  
What is more revealing is that states continue to develop metrics based on federal grant 
guidance, and in doing so, each state’s approach and final product is different.  State and 
local public health agencies find themselves changing directions with each new policy 
directive or changing grant guidance, and have considered themselves “laboratories for 
the development of performance measures to assess implementation of their preparedness 
programs.”25  The survey results also bring to light some encouraging trends; however, 
including the development of metrics as an evolutionary process, program 
implementation as a process of growth and maturation, and movement from measuring 
capacity to measuring capability in public health preparedness. 
Turning to the IOM, it provides science-based advice on matters of biomedical 
science, medicine, and health.  The significance of the literature published by the IOM is 
that this non-profit organization works outside the sphere of government to ensure 
                                                 
24 Lurie et al., “Conceptualizing and Defining Public Health Emergency Preparedness,” S7. 
25 Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, Public Health Preparedness: How Do We 
Measure Success? (Washington, DC: ASTHO, 2006), 2 http://www.astho.org/pubs/Preparedness-
MeasuringSuccess.pdf (accessed August 22, 2007). 
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scientifically informed analysis and independent guidance.  The focus of their mission is 
to serve as advisor to the nation to improve health by providing un-biased, evidence-
based information to policy makers, professionals, and leaders in every sector of society 
and the public at large.26  A number of publications released by the IOM provide 
valuable evidence-based information for public health preparedness planning, and cover a 
range of topics, including the public health system and its infrastructure, pandemic 
influenza, community containment for pandemic influenza, emerging infectious diseases, 
and preparedness of the public health community.  Despite this evidence-based literature, 
the IOM is not often cited in the sub-literature groups of government and non-profit 
organizations.  The IOM is, however, referred to in some of the academic literature, 
which addresses public health preparedness.   
5. Summary 
This review canvassed the literature on public health systems and infrastructure, 
strategy, governmental public health, the SARS epidemic in 2003, public health 
preparedness planning, and evaluation.  Policy makers, academia, and governmental 
public health agencies tasked with preparing the nation for infectious disease, terrorism, 
or catastrophic disasters view these issues from widely diverse perspectives.  Policy 
makers’ views are shaped from the opinions and needs of constituents and various 
interest groups.  Governmental agencies strive to follow the direction of legislative 
mandates, executive orders, and funding guidance.  Non-profit organizations and 
professional associations focus on advocacy for their members.  Researchers and 
academics try to make sense of it all, apply relevant theory and provide a scientific basis 
for the direction and decisions made.   
The literature on the need for or development of a national public health system 
for providing national security is limited.  This review has resulted in a demonstrated 
need for further research in the design of and critical needs for the current U.S. public 
health system to fulfill its new mission of national public health security.   
                                                 
26 IOM, “About the IOM,” http://www.iom.edu/CMS/AboutIOM.aspx (accessed September 9, 2007). 
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E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH   
Public health has been called upon to ensure that the nation’s health is protected 
and to be the leader in national public health security.  A cohesive effort is needed to 
better understand what infrastructure and resources are needed to ensure the nation is 
prepared for an infectious disease epidemic, whether naturally occurring or intentionally 
introduced.  This research effort seeks to identify lessons learned from the Canadian 
governmental response to the SARS epidemic in 2003 that may be applicable in the 
United States  This research also seeks to identify the critical infrastructure and resources 
that are needed for the public health system in the United States to fulfill its new mission 
of national public health security.  Contributions in data and analysis toward revitalizing 
and modernizing the current U.S. public health system will be made.  It will serve as a 
starting point for thinking in new ways and designing new strategies for harnessing the 
collective power of thousands of public health agencies across the United States in 
protecting this nation’s health.  Lastly, this research will contribute to the overall field of 
homeland security by enhancing knowledge in the area of national public health security.   
Primary consumers of this research will be federal, state, and local public health 
and homeland security policy makers, leaders and practitioners.  Secondary consumers of 
this research will include academic institutions, non-profit organizations, and possibly the 
media.  Future research efforts will be necessary to get up-to-date information on existing 
public health infrastructure and resources in the United States.  In addition, vigorous 
inquiry and debate will be necessary in order to explore impacts on the current roles and 
responsibilities of public health given its new mission.  A challenge will be maintaining 
the traditional while implementing the new.   
F. METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this research is to make a contribution toward improving the U.S. 
public health system’s ability to provide national security.  The research methodology 
utilized for this thesis is a comparative case study approach.  The main focus of the case 
study was the Canadian governmental health system’s response to the SARS epidemic 
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from November 2002 through July 2003 when SARS was declared contained worldwide.  
The author then used comparative analysis to ascertain strengths and weaknesses in the 
Canadian health system compared to the U.S. public health system in order to formulate 
improvement recommendations.   
The SARS epidemic, specifically in Canada, was chosen because of its proximity 
to the United States and for the fact that both countries’ public health systems are 
products of federalism.  In addition, SARS is one of the most recent “live” responses to a 
novel infectious disease that was transmissible human-to-human and quickly spread 
through our interconnected world, country to country and continent to continent.  
Detailed analysis of the events as they unfolded are documented and presented through a 
story-type narrative.  The story is told from the emergence of the virus, through its 
transmission, and how it swept across the globe, infecting thousands and killing 
hundreds.  Specific response events are shared chronologically from the experiences in 
Toronto, Ontario.  The story reveals the enormous impact this novel virus had on public 
health and health care workers, the government, and how an unprepared system may in 
fact increase illness and deaths caused by a novel infectious disease.  In addition, this 
story reveals the tremendous impact on the economy and social stability of a country 
during and immediately following an epidemic. 
Through this story and the governmental response to SARS, the author presents a 
grid isolating and characterizing the public health system components that were most 
problematic in Canada during the SARS epidemic.  As systemic deficiencies emerge, 
lessons to be learned are identified.  The U.S. public health system components are then 
compared to those in Canada in order to generate recommendations for improving 
national public health security. 
G. OVERVIEW OF REMAINING THESIS CHAPTERS 
Chapter II presents an overview of the history on infectious diseases and outlines 




outbreak.  The science behind SARS is presented and a discussion is provided on how 
microbes and humans interact.  This chapter also provides initial background on the 
SARS epidemic and prepares the reader for the SARS story. 
Chapter III provides a compelling case study story of the SARS epidemic in 
Canada.  It presents the horrific challenges faced by public health and health care workers 
in battling a novel infectious disease that was attacking the very infrastructure designed 
to protect its citizenry.  The emergence of the disease and response to the epidemic is 
tracked in Ontario, Canada.  Numbers of cases, transmission routes, and critical events 
are presented. 
Chapter IV begins with a presentation of the decay of public health over the last 
several decades, citing examples of previous warnings and alarms regarding the need for 
a strong public health system.  Next, this chapter provides the reader with an overview of 
governmental public health in Ontario and presents the government’s response to the 
SARS epidemic.  Key system-preparedness capacity and capability issues are identified 
and presented. 
Chapter V outlines a number of key lessons to be learned from the SARS 
epidemic based on four major reports highlighting weaknesses in Ontario’s public health 
system.  From these reports, common lessons learned emerge and recommendations are 
cited.  Next, this chapter outlines a number of improvements made in the Canadian public 
health system, presenting funding allocations and infrastructure support since 2004.  
Chapter VI provides a more comprehensive overview of governmental 
responsibilities for public health in Canada and the United States.  Organizational tables 
for both federal agencies are presented outlining capacity, roles and responsibilities.  In 
addition, the WHO’s roles and responsibilities are highlighted.  Next, a comparative 
analysis is provided in table format of critical system components of the public health 
systems in Canada and the United States.  The narrative that follows provides results of 




Chapter VII provides a summary of findings from the SARS case study and a 
comparative analysis of the Canadian and U.S. public health systems.  Conclusions are 
presented and recommendations formulated based on this research. 
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II. MICROBIAL WAR—THE SARS EPIDEMIC 
A. HISTORY OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
Public health covers a broad range of complex issues internationally down to the 
individual family and includes consequences of poverty, war, and natural and manmade 
disasters.  Separating people with disease from the healthy population is an ancient 
practice with Biblical and Koranic references to the isolation of leapers.  By the seventh 
century, China had a policy for detaining sailors and other foreign travelers suffering 
from plague.27  The term quarantine was used in the late fourteenth century and isolation 
of people arriving from plague infected areas occurred at seaports.28  This type of public 
health containment measure became widespread internationally in following centuries.  
The WHO reported an outbreak of plague as recently as 1994 in India with 700 suspected 
cases and fifty-six deaths.  This outbreak captured international media attention resulting 
in economic consequences of an estimated $1.7 billion lost in trade and travel.   
One of the oldest known infectious viral diseases is smallpox.  Its existence goes 
back over 3,000 years appearing in Egypt initially then introduced in southern China 
about the year 50 AD, into Europe in the following few centuries, in western Africa by 
the tenth century, and in America in the sixteenth century.29  In the 1950s, it is estimated 
that 50 million cases occurred globally each year with approximately 15 million deaths.  
Global eradication occurred in 1979 following a successful worldwide vaccination 
campaign.  Since naturally occurring smallpox has been eradicated for thirty years and 
population-based vaccination has been stopped, it is now a concern that a deliberate 
release of the virus could cause significant harm.  Is the capacity and capability of the  
 
 
                                                 
27 World Health Organization (WHO), The World Health Report 2007 – A safer future: global public 
health in the 21st century, http://www.who.int/whr/2007/en/ (accessed September 23, 2007), 2.  
28 Ibid., 2. 
29 Ibid., 5. 
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public health system in the United States prepared to contain a deliberately caused 
smallpox outbreak rapidly to minimize injury and death, and to ensure smallpox does not 
become endemic again?   
Population growth, rapid urbanization, environmental degradation, and misuse of 
antimicrobials have disrupted the equilibrium of the microbial world.  The infectious 
disease situation is anything but stable.30 
B. WAR AGAINST NATURE  
Fighting a war against nature—that is, a war against communicable diseases—is a 
form of warfare that has awakened some governments to the fact that microbes pose a 
significant threat to national security.  In the United States, the anthrax attacks in 2001 
focused attention on the intentional use of biological agents as terrorist weapons.  The 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003, however, served as a 
wake-up call that an infectious disease, even if not intentionally used as a weapon, could 
be equally disruptive and costly as a conventional war.31  The SARS epidemic was a war 
against an enemy too small to see with the human eye, came without warning, and 
traveled across the globe through communities not fully prepared to fight.  This threat did 
not come from an invading military army or terrorists using biological agents; rather, this 
threat came from nature.  This was a war against an unknown virus that had successfully 
found a new host and caused an infectious disease epidemic in humans.  In the beginning, 
nothing was known about SARS.  It was not known: 
• where the virus came from;  
• what tests were needed to determine if one had SARS; 
• how long it might be until one got sick after coming in contact with 
someone who had SARS (incubation period); 
• what one’s symptoms should be if sick with SARS (clinical description); 
• the timeframe for possibly exposing others (infectious period); 
                                                 
30 WHO, The World Health Report 2007, “Overview,” 2. 
31 Thomas Abraham, Twenty First Century Plague: The Story of SARS (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2004), 2. 
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• the microbe that causes SARS; or 
• what treatments or vaccines were needed to reduce one’s illness or to treat 
one from SARS?   
Today, there is still no prevention or treatment for SARS.32 
From middle school science class, most remember that a virus needs a living cell 
to survive and reproduce itself.  A virus basically preys on other life forms.  A host could 
be a person, or other living animal, including birds and arthropods, or plants.  Interaction 
between virus and host does not always lead to disease.  More severe forms of viral 
disease tend to appear the first time a virus encounters a new host.  This new 
acquaintance may cause a more virulent relationship between the host and the virus, 
leading to fatal disease.  Many of the new viral diseases appearing in humans over the 
last several decades have emerged from viruses jumping from animal host to human host 
(zoonotic diseases).  This is in part due to human population expansion across the globe 
and occupation in new ecological regions of the world.33   
The SARS global epidemic in 2003 has been recognized as the first major 
infectious disease threat of the twenty-first century.34  SARS targeted a critical 
component of homeland security—the public health system.  From the first few cases of 
SARS, this virus not only challenged the medical and public health system, it also 
attacked the soldiers who were vital to caring for and defending the health of the society 
as a whole; public health and health care workers.  The first health worker to die of SARS 
was a fifty-seven-year-old ambulance service provider in the southern Chinese city of 
Guangzhou.35  The SARS epidemic eventually sickened over 1,700 health workers 
                                                 
32 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), “Frequently Asked Questions about SARS,” 
April 26, 2004, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/sars-faq.pdf (accessed April 26, 2008). 
33 Health Canada, National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, “Learning from SARS: 
Renewal of Public Health in Canada,” (Ottawa, October 2003), 23, http://www.phac-
aspc.gc.ca/publicat/sars-sras/pdf/sars-e.pdf (accessed April 22, 2008). 
34 James W. LeDue and M. Anita Barry, “SARS, the First Pandemic of the 21st Century,” Emerging 
Infectious Diseases, 10, no. 11 (November 2004): 1. 
35 Abraham, Twenty First Century Plague: The Story of SARS, 18. 
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worldwide.36  The soldiers included doctors, nurses, emergency medical providers, 
laboratorians, epidemiologists, and research scientists who worked around the clock to 
prevent, investigate, and fight the virus.   
Health care soldiers take care of those who are ill, while public health soldiers 
investigate outbreaks to unravel mysteries about microbes that cause disease.  
Laboratorians and scientists conduct research and work to discover and test for disease.  
Public health disease investigators use knowledge in the areas of medicine, 
epidemiology, and statistics to determine who, when, where, and what about an infectious 
disease.  All these soldiers must work together to develop and implement effective 
prevention, control, and treatment measures to reduce illness and death caused by an 
infectious disease.   
Health care facilities were also severely impacted by SARS.  Transmission in 
hospitals was a major contributing factor to the spread of SARS during the epidemic.  
Health care workers accounted for 21 percent of all cases globally.  In Toronto alone, of 
the seventy-four cases reported from April 15 through June 9, 39 percent were health care 
workers, 38 percent resulted from exposure during hospitalization, and 23 percent 
occurred among hospital visitors.37  The risk of transmission was greatest among those 
involved in direct patient care or other close contact with a patient.  Transmission to 
casual or social contacts was uncommon; however, secondary cases have been 
documented after exposures in the workplace and on airplanes and other conveyances.38     
Unlike soldiers in a conventional war trained to face death, public health and 
health care soldiers are trained to save lives.39  With SARS, these soldiers found 
themselves thrust to the front lines of a war against nature and the time needed to uncover 
the mystery of a deadly novel virus, prevent further spread, and treat those infected. 
                                                 
36 WHO, “Summary of probable SARS cases with onset of illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 
2003,” http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en (accessed April 24, 2008). 
37 Umesh D. Parashar and Larry J. Anderson, “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Review and 
Lessons of the 2003 Outbreak,” International Journal of Epidemiology, 33, no. 4 (2004): 630. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Abraham, Twenty First Century Plague: The Story of SARS, 2.  
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Uncovering the mystery of a novel virus is as much like a story of inquiry and 
discovery as it is a story of science and medicine.  There is an outbreak, people are 
getting sick, and no one knows why.  The investigation is about disease and is conducted 
by public health.  It requires a strong line of inquiry about a disease to uncover clues 
about why people are getting sick.  This fact-finding mission takes time. In order to 
unravel the mysteries behind a novel virus such as SARS, many questions must be 
answered.  This requires the collective work of many soldiers in public health and health 
care.   
Without adequate public health system preparedness, the collective health of 
populations living across geographical regions and international boundaries is threatened 
by infectious disease.  It is now known that SARS is a viral respiratory illness 
transmissible from person to person by close contact.  Close contact, in this context, is 
defined as caring for or living with someone who is infected, and therefore, has possible 
direct contact with their respiratory secretions.40  SARS is thought to be transmitted most 
readily by respiratory droplets produced when an infected person coughs or sneezes.  The 
virus can also spread when a person touches a surface or object contaminated with 
infectious droplets and then touches his or her mouth, nose, or eyes.  In addition, SARS 
may be spread more broadly through the air, through feces or by other ways that are not 
currently known.41 
When exposed to someone infected with SARS, the incubation period is typically 
three to ten days.  In a very small portion of the SARS cases, incubation periods of up to 
fourteen days have been reported.42  SARS begins with flu-like symptoms characterized 
by fever (>100.4 °F), fatigue, headache, chills, muscle pain, a feeling of uneasiness, and 
in some cases, diarrhea.43  People infected with SARS are most likely to be contagious 
                                                 
40 CDC, “Frequently Asked Questions About SARS,” 1. 
41 Iowa Department of Public Health (IDPH), “Epi Manual: Guide to Surveillance, Investigation, and 
Reporting,” SARS, http://www.idph.state.ia.us/idph_universalhelp/main.aspx?system+IdphEpiManual 
(accessed June 1, 2008). 




when they have symptoms, such as fever or a cough.  Patients have been found to be 
most contagious during the second week of illness, with the maximum time period of 
communicability being less than twenty-one days.44  While most people spread SARS to 
one or two other people, some people were super spreaders—that is, they spread the virus 
to a disproportionately large number of other people.  In these early stages of the 
epidemic, the rate of transmission was low with a SARS patient spreading the virus to 
two or maybe three other people.45                  
The agent that causes SARS is a member of the family coronaviridae.46  During 
the SARS epidemic, a SARS-like coronavirus (SARS-CoV) was isolated from palm 
civets (Paguma larvata) captured in remote areas of China where the epidemic 
originated.  This virus closely matched virus samples taken from people who were sick.  
Other animals have shown evidence of infection, but on a smaller scale.  There were no 
clinical samples available from the first SARS patient in China to test for the virus; 
however, the second identified SARS case was a chef , Huang Xingchu, who worked at a 
restaurant and was reported to have atypical pneumonia.  As a chef, he came into regular 
contact with several types of live caged animals used as exotic game food, including 
civets.  He sought medical care and subsequently infected his wife, two sisters, and seven 
medical staff with SARS.47   
Epidemiological investigations suggest that SARS probably first emerged in 
satellite cities of Guangzhou, Guangdong Province.  (Refer to Figure 2 in Chapter III.)  
The virus was most likely circulating for approximately two months before the first major 
outbreak in Guangzhou.  Serological tests and isolation of the virus confirmed that 
SARS-CoV was the primary infectious agent of the early cases of SARS. 48  Forty-two 
                                                 
44 IDPH, “Epi Manual,” SARS. 
45 J.M. Last, ed., A Dictionary of Epidemiology, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
36. 
46 IDPH, “Epi Manual,” SARS.  
47 N S Zhong, et al., “Epidemiology and cause of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 
Guangdong, People’s Republic of China, in February 2003,” The Lancet, 362 (October 25, 2003): 1355. 
48 Ibid., 1357. 
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percent of the early SARS patients were involved in either the trade or preparation of 
food from wild animals in markets in Guangdong Province.49  In response to the concerns 
regarding the origin of the SARS virus, the CDC issued an embargo order on importation 
of civets on January 13, 2004.  Up to this time, civets were being imported into the 
United States and distributed further.50   
Not only is the behavior of a virus a threat to health, but also human behaviors, 
such as the food eaten or relationships with the environment that can create optimal 
conditions for the emergence of a new infectious disease.  It does, however, take more 
than a virus simply jumping from animal host to human host to cause the emergence of a 
novel infectious disease leading to an epidemic or pandemic.  A number of factors can 
create an environment in which infectious diseases emerge and become endemic in 
society.  It is the convergence of these factors and the human–microbe interaction that 
contribute to the emergence of novel infectious diseases.  The microbial threat is 
increased with the convergence of any one or multiple set of factors: 1) genetic and 
biological, 2) physical environmental, 3) ecological, and 4) social, political, and 
economic factors.51  Refer to Figure 1.   
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http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/civet_ban_exec_order.htm (accessed April 27, 2008). 
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Figure 1.   Infectious Disease Convergence Model 
The center box represents the convergence of factors leading to emergence of a 
novel infectious disease.  The white outer edges of this box identify what is known about 
the factors in infectious disease emergence, and the black center represents the unknown.  
Crossing into the center box are the two main characters, the human host and the 
microbe.  The human host and microbe interaction is influenced by the factors in the 
outer boxes.52 
An epidemic is the occurrence of cases of an illness in a community or region that 
is clearly in excess of what is normally expected.  An outbreak is similar to an epidemic 
but is limited to a localized increase in the incidence of a disease, e.g., in a village, town, 
or closed institution.53  The number of cases indicating the presence of an epidemic 
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varies according to 1) the agent, 2) the size and type of population exposed, 3) the 
previous experience or lack of exposure to the disease, and 4) the time and place of 
occurrence.54  A pandemic is an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, 
crossing international boundaries, and usually affecting a large number of people.55  
During November 2002 to July 2003, 8,098 probable SARS cases were reported to the 
World Health Organization (WHO) from twenty-nine countries; thus, this was a 
pandemic.56   
In order for an epidemic or pandemic to occur, the virus must be readily 
transmissible from human to human, as was SARS.  The emergence of a novel infectious 
disease, a resurgence of endemic diseases, the appearance of new antimicrobial-resistant 
forms of diseases, and the intentional use of biological agents to do harm are all included 
in the spectrum of microbial threats.  Winning wars against infectious disease and 
contributing to the public health security of the nation requires strengthening public 
health preparedness at all levels.  No single country, state, or community, regardless of 
how capable, wealthy, or technologically advanced, can alone prevent, detect, and 
respond to all public health threats.  In an era of rapid global travel, any country, state, or 
city could face the challenges and consequences of an infectious disease epidemic or 
pandemic.   
C. GENESIS OF THE EPIDEMIC 
International and U.S. public health officials worked urgently to address the 
SARS epidemic that ultimately spread from continent to continent.  Worldwide, the 
epidemic spanned just over seven months from November 2002, with the first case 
identified as atypical pneumonia, to July 2003 when the WHO declared the SARS 
epidemic contained.  SARS affected five continents and spread across the globe in a 
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matter of a few weeks, basically traveling at the speed of a jet airplane.57  This means that 
an outbreak in any one part of the world may be only a few hours away from becoming 
an imminent public health threat somewhere else.  This poses a “universal vulnerability” 
to the public’s health worldwide.  Nearly forty new diseases were unknown a generation 
ago, and during the last five years, the WHO has verified more than 1,100 epidemic 
events worldwide.58   
By March of 2003, SARS had spread from Guangdong Province in China to 
neighboring Hong Kong, Canada, and beyond.  The epidemic caused more than 900 
deaths.59  Outside of Asia, Canada was the country hardest hit by SARS.  Most Canadian 
cases were concentrated in the Ontario area and all deaths were in Toronto.60  Over 
10,000 individuals in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) were placed in voluntary isolation 
or supervised quarantine.61  Table 1 provides a summary of probable SARS cases and 
deaths in Canada with onset of illness from November 1, 2002 to July 31, 2003.62  
Table 1.   Summary of Probable SARS Cases and Deaths in Canada 
 Cumulative # of Cases Based on Data as of 31 December 2003 

































* Includes only cases whose death is attributed to SARS. 
**Health Care Worker (HCW)   
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SARS was a tragedy.  In the space of a few short months, the deadly virus 
emerged from the jungles of central China, traveled across the globe and killed forty-
three in Ontario and struck down more than 330 others with serious lung disease.  It 
caused untold suffering to its victims and their families, forced thousands into quarantine, 
brought the health system in the Greater Toronto Area and other parts of the province to 
its knees and seriously impacted health systems in other parts of the country.63  
Chapter III provides an abbreviated story of the SARS epidemic in Canada.  It is a 
reminder of how public health and health care fought nature through two waves of the 
battle against a new infectious disease during an extraordinary seven-month period of 
time.  In this story, the emergence of a novel infectious disease occurs, the response to a 
worldwide epidemic follows, and key challenges faced by Ontario’s public health system 
and lessons to be learned are uncovered.  These events played out between November 
2002 and July 2003 when worldwide containment of SARS was declared.  
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III. THE SARS STORY IN ONTARIO CANADA 
A. EMERGENCE OF THE MYSTERY DISEASE  
On November 16, 2002, the first case of atypical pneumonia, later to be identified 
and considered the first case of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), occurs in 
Foshan City, Guangdong Province, China.  Refer to Figure 2 for a map of this region.  
The patient is a forty-six-year-old village committee official who had been admitted to a 
hospital in Foshan.  Within a few days, his wife and other family members also become 
sick.  He had no history of travel outside Foshan in the weeks prior to becoming ill, nor 
had he been in contact with wild animals.  He recovered and was discharged from the 
hospital on January 8. 
On December 10, less than four weeks after this first case, a thirty-four-year-old 
restaurant chef, Huang Xingchu, is admitted to a hospital in Heyuan with a respiratory 
illness that does not respond to medical treatment.  He cooks wild animal meat, but is not 
involved in killing animals.  He recovers and is discharged from the hospital; however, 
seven medical workers who cared for him later fall ill.   
A twenty-six-year-old factory worker in Jiangmen is struck with a respiratory 
illness that does not respond to medical treatment on December 21.  Only a few days later 
on December 26, a thirty-year-old male who worked as a chef in Zhongshan is admitted 
to the hospital and infects twelve others, including two relatives and ten health workers.64   
In early January 2003, the public in Heyuan and Zhongshan becomes alarmed 
about the number of health workers getting sick.  Healthy people begin to seek medicines 
on their own for fear of contracting the mystery illness.  The provincial centre for disease 
is notified by both communities and teams are sent to investigate.  Beijing also sends a 
team.  By January 23, the investigating team in Zhongshan has produced a five-page 
report describing the disease as “atypical pneumonia,” and releases the report to major 
hospitals in the region.   
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Zhou Zuofeng, later realized to be the first SARS “super spreader,” is admitted to 
Zhongshan Medical University in Guangzhou on January 30, 2003.65  The number of 
SARS cases in Guangzhou is on the rise, and by mid-February, Hong Kong media is 
reporting that there is a mysterious illness in Guangdong Province causing panic.  The 
WHO regional office in Manila sends a request to the Chinese Ministry of Health for 
information on February 10.  On February 11, Guangdong provincial health authorities 
hold a press conference acknowledging the disease, but announce the outbreak is under 
control. 
 
Figure 2.   Map of Guangdong Province, China 
By February 15, health officials from the Chinese Ministry of Health and 
Guangdong province have reported 305 cases and five deaths of an acute respiratory 
syndrome.  The outbreak is clinically consistent with atypical pneumonia and these cases 
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would later be added to the SARS count.  At about the same time, the WHO Beijing 
office receives an email message describing a “strange contagious disease” that has “left 
more than 100 people dead” in Guangdong province in one week’s time.  Additionally, 
the message further describes, “a panic attitude where people are emptying 
pharmaceutical stocks of any medicine they think may protect them.”66 
On February 22, a sixty-four-year-old doctor from Zhongshan Medical University 
in Guangzhou travels to Hong Kong for a wedding and checks into the Metropole Hotel.  
The doctor had experienced symptoms of the flu for several days, but felt well enough to 
sight-see, do some shopping, and visit his brother-in-law.  By the next day, he seeks 
medical care at the Kwong Wan Hospital and is admitted to the Intensive Care Unit 
(ICU) in respiratory failure.  The doctor warns health workers caring for him that he had 
previously treated patients with atypical pneumonia and fears he had contracted a 
“virulent disease.”67 
It was a forty-six-year-old sea merchant from Guangzhou who had traveled to 
Zhongshan in early February and most likely infected the doctor.  The patient had been 
admitted to the Second Affiliated Hospital for approximately eighteen hours, infecting 
more than thirty hospital staff.  He was then transferred by ambulance to the Third 
Affiliated Hospital of Zhongshan University.  During the ambulance transfer, two 
doctors, two nurses, and the emergency medical technician became infected.  The 
emergency medical technician Fan Xinde was the first health care worker to die of 
SARS.  He was not originally scheduled to work on the day of this transfer, but had 
graciously agreed to cover the shift for a co-worker who had recently lost his mother and 
wanted to spend time with his bereaved father.68  He was warned that the patient was 
infectious and he was given a “triple-layer” surgical mask and gloves to wear.  During the 
transfer, the patient struggled to breath and vomited in the back of the ambulance.   
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Following the transfer, Fan spent over an hour cleaning and disinfecting the ambulance.  
Fan became ill and died on February 24.  Within the next week, twenty more medical 
staff and nineteen family members or close relatives of the patient also became ill.69   
A global epidemic was ignited when this physician exposed and infected guests at 
the Metropole hotel after he checked in on February 21.  These guests would travel on 
and plant the seed for large outbreaks in other countries, including Canada, causing 
secondary cases in family members, health workers, and other close contacts.  The 
earliest cases of SARS, however, appear unlinked and are from several different 
municipalities in the Guangdong province area.  Other early cases included another chef 
and an ambulance service worker.  Before the first battle began in Canada, other battles 
with SARS were already occurring.70  
On February 22, a day after the Guangdong doctor checked into the Metropole 
Hotel, Sui-chu Kwan, a seventy-eight-year-old female tourist from Toronto, Canada 
checks out of the hotel and begins her journey home.  On arrival in Toronto, she is 
reunited with her family.  On March 4, the Guangdong doctor dies of atypical 
pneumonia. By March 5, Sui-chu Kwan has died at home.  Family members do not want 
an autopsy and the coroner identifies heart attack as the cause of death.71  Five members 
of her family are infected with the mysterious disease and are later admitted to the 
hospital.   
See Figure 3 for a representation of the SARS chain of transmission among guests 
at Metropole Hotel resulting in SARS being carried to Canada and other countries. 
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Figure 3.   On March 12, the WHO issues a global alert in Hong Kong and Hanoi 
regarding a “mysterious illness,” with reference to atypical pneumonia, soon 
to be called SARS.  By March 13, Sui-chu’s forty-four-year-old son has 
died in Scarborough Grace Hospital while physicians are in the process of 
ruling out tuberculosis.  Sui-chu Kwan is considered the first SARS case in 
Toronto.72 
On March 14, health authorities in Ontario take steps to alert doctors, hospitals, 
ambulance services, and public health units across the province that there are several 
cases of atypical pneumonia in Toronto which have resulted in two deaths, occurring 
within a single family.  Prior to this alert, the British Columbia Centre for Disease 
Control and Toronto public health officials had sent broadcast emails to doctors and 
infection control specialists in late February regarding influenza-like illnesses being 
reported in travelers from China.  On March 15, the WHO names the mysterious illness 
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after its symptoms: severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and declares it “a 
worldwide health threat.”  In addition, the WHO issues a rare travel advisory as evidence 
mounts that SARS is spreading by air travel along international routes.  The first case 
definitions of suspect and probable cases of SARS are released and the WHO further 
calls on all travelers to be aware of the signs and symptoms, and issues guidance to 
airlines.   
By March 16, over 150 suspect and probable cases of SARS have been reported 
from around the world; suspected cases are being reported in Canada, Germany, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and the United Kingdom as well as Hong Kong, Vietnam, and Singapore.  The 
cumulative total cases reported to WHO is escalating rapidly.73  
The United States reports its first suspected case to the WHO on March 20 and by 
March 26, the CDC has received fifty-one reports of suspected SARS cases from twenty-
one states.  The first suspected case is a fifty-three-year-old male who traveled to 
Singapore and became ill on March 10.  Subsequently, four clusters of suspected cases 
are identified.  Three were from a traveler who visited Southeast Asia and stayed at the 
Metropole Hotel.74   
B. THE FIRST BATTLE UNFOLDS AND PEAKS  
By mid-March, laboratory tests on Ms. Kwan’s son came back negative for 
tuberculosis and other family members remained sick.75  Public health officials and 
several physicians began to unravel part of the mystery.  There was an unusual 
respiratory illness in Guangdong that had apparently spread to Hong Kong.  Ms. Kwan 
had recently traveled to Hong Kong, returned to Toronto and had died at home.  Soon 
after, her son developed a respiratory illness, died, and other family members were ill.  
The attending physicians recognized the need to implement prevention measures to 
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reduce the spread of this unusual infectious disease, but the exact mode of transmission 
was still unknown.  This decision led to ambulance transfers of ill family members to 
other hospitals with negative pressure isolation room capacity.  Sunnybrook and 
Women’s College Health Science Centre, Mount Sinai Hospital, and Toronto Western all 
accepted ill family members.  A granddaughter was admitted to the Hospital for Sick 
Children.76 
Behind the scenes, a person exposed to Ms. Kwan’s son in the emergency 
department returned to Scarborough Hospital by ambulance on March 13 and had 
suffered a heart attack.  His contact with Ms. Kwan’s son was known; however, his 
cardiac symptoms did not alert health workers to be concerned about SARS.  They used 
only standard infection control precautions while treating, and subsequently, transferring 
this patient to York Central Hospital for additional cardiac care.  This patient would be 
the source of another cluster of infections that eventually affected more than fifty people 
and would close York Central Hospital.  Another person who had been treated in the 
emergency department in a bed adjacent to Ms. Kwan’s son had returned to Scarborough 
Hospital on March 16 with respiratory symptoms and a fever.  He was placed in  
isolation; however, his wife who was with him in the emergency department infected 
seven visitors, six hospital staff, two other patients, two paramedics, a firefighter, and a 
housekeeper.  In addition, the physician who worked to save this patient’s life developed 
SARS along with three assisting nurses.  As one would expect, anxieties were growing 
about this mysterious disease.77  
On March 13, Health Canada received notification of the Toronto cluster, and 
convened the first of what would become daily teleconferences involving federal, 
provincial, and territorial public health officials.78  The Ontario Ministry of Health and 
Long Term Care held a press conference the next day and brought this mysterious disease 
to the headlines of national and international news.  The battle continued to rage at 
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Scarborough Hospital; more patients, staff, and visitors developed symptoms of the new 
disease, and on March 23, emergency and intensive care services began to refuse new 
admissions and transfers from other hospitals.  Visitor access was being limited.  In 
addition, outpatient clinics were closed, health workers were barred from working at 
other institutions, and multiple home quarantine orders were being issued to those who 
were potentially exposed.  Strict infection control policies and procedures were being 
implemented in health care settings.  Compounding the situation was the limited 
availability of negative pressure isolation rooms in the Toronto area, and when additional 
rooms were located, the number of qualified staff to care for the ill had already been 
exhausted.   
While Toronto was waging a battle against the virus, British Columbia was 
dealing with a man who had also stayed at the Metropole Hotel and had arrived at the 
Vancouver General Hospital with flu-like symptoms.  Unlike Ms. Kwan, he went straight 
to the hospital and had not been in contact with any family or friends since his return.  
The attending physician and other health workers ensured that this patient was masked 
and quickly isolated.  This occurred before anything was known in Vancouver about what 
was occurring in Toronto.  Later, there would be only one report of secondary 
transmission from this case.79  
To give health officials authority to track exposed and infected people, and issue 
orders to prevent the spread of disease, the Ontario government designated SARS as a 
reportable disease under the Health Protection and Promotion Act on March 25.  On that 
date, Health Canada was reporting nineteen cases of SARS in Canada, eighteen in 
Ontario and a single case in Vancouver; however, forty-eight more patients suspected of 
having SARS had been admitted to area hospitals.  Many more had symptoms and would 
eventually be identified as SARS cases.  A declaration of a provincial emergency was 
declared on March 26; this required all hospitals to create SARS units to care for patients.   
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It would later be learned that this period, March 25-27, was the peak of the first battle or 
wave of SARS in Toronto.  Refer to Figure 4.  With new information from China, 
worldwide cases had soared to 1,323 with forty-nine deaths.80  
 
(N=250).  Excludes one patient for whom onset date is unknown.
Adapted from Health Canada, National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, “Learning from SARS: 
Renewal of Public Health in Canada,” (October 2003).
 
Figure 4.   Probable Cases in Canada, February 23 to July 2, 2003 
The Ontario Provincial emergency declaration also gave Premier Ernie Eves the 
power to direct and control local governments and facilities to ensure that essential 
services were provided.  On the same day the premier declares the emergency, the 
province activates its multi-ministry Provincial Operations Centre (POC) for emergency 
response.  All hospitals in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) are ordered to go “code 
orange,” i.e., all non-essential services are to be suspended.  In addition, hospitals are  
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required to limit visitors, create isolation units for potential SARS patients, and provide 
appropriate infection control protection equipment to employees.  SARS patients are 
being cared for at over twenty hospitals in the GTA.   
On March 30, Canadian officials close York Central Hospital to new patients and 
request hundreds of its employees to quarantine themselves voluntarily.81 By April 2, the 
cumulative world total of SARS cases has passed the 2,000 mark.82  
Public health workers in Toronto and York continue to trace and quarantine 
people exposed to SARS with some good results.  These workers are praised by many 
and credited for containing the SARS outbreak.  However, despite this success, concerns 
continue to mount that SARS would spread to the community.  On April 3, individuals 
who attended a funeral, would be quarantined because family members of the deceased 
have developed SARS symptoms.  An employee of a large technology firm who attended 
this funeral, becomes non-compliant with a quarantine order and returns to work when ill.  
He infects one co-worker and sends nearly two hundred more into quarantine.  Toronto 
public health closes a school when one student (a child of a health worker) presents with 
SARS symptoms.  Four other schools are closed by local school boards out of concern 
over SARS.  Despite these actions, there is no real evidence that SARS was spreading in 
the community.  Using traditional public health interventions such as tracing those who 
had been exposed to someone with SARS symptoms and ordering them into quarantine, 
community spread appears to be minimal.   
By the end of the first week in April, ninety-one probable and 135 suspect SARS 
cases have been reported in Canada and ten people have died.83  By April 11, SARS 
cases had been reported in nineteen countries on four continents with the cumulative 
number of worldwide cases approaching the 3,000 mark.84 
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Still concerned about community spread, Toronto public health officials 
aggressively investigate a cluster of thirty-one suspect and probable SARS cases during 
the second and third week of April in members of a religious group.  Initial exposures 
may have occurred at the Scarborough Hospital, and subsequently, during two large 
gatherings of the religious group on March 28 and 29.  The virus quietly spread through 
the religious group to extended family members, health workers who treated them, and 
other close contacts.  On April 13, a family physician working in a Sunnybrook and 
Women’s SARS unit may have been infected when caring for members of this religious 
group.  He begins to suffer from increased shortness of breath and is immediately 
transferred to the ICU where non-invasive procedures are used to assist his breathing.  
When this fails, a breathing tube is inserted.  Transfer and insertion of the breathing tube 
takes several hours, including exposing other health workers to coughed-up secretions 
and aerosols generated by the devices used to assist his breathing.  Eleven more health 
workers become ill.   
On April 20, Sunnybrook and Women’s closes the SARS unit and ICU because 
too many health workers are ill or quarantined.  This results in desperate requests from 
hospital administrators for medical support.  At this point, Sunnybrook and Women’s is 
now carrying the largest volume of SARS patients in the GTA.  The military sends 
critical care specialists.  One physician comes from the United Kingdom and another 
from Montreal.  Further support only comes after the province contracts with a private 
agency.85 
Public health workers continue active surveillance and quarantine to ensure that 
SARS does not spread to the community.  People exposed through the religious group 
live in Toronto and York and in the surrounding regions of Durham and Peel.  Their 
public health units join forces to conduct the investigation.  Hospitals begin to complain 
that they are receiving multiple calls from different public health units answering the 
same questionnaires and surveys.  This is the result of a lack of overarching coordination 
among public health units from different jurisdictions.  At the same time, hospitals are 
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answering questions from the Provincial Operations Centre (POC) and the Ministry’s 
Public Health Branch.  By this time, local public health workers are nearing exhaustion.  
All non-SARS public health activity is suspended and most public health workers are 
only addressing SARS.86  The total cumulative number of probable SARS cases has now 
climbed to 4,288 worldwide, with 140 in Toronto.87         
Despite the heightened concern for community spread, by April 23, only one 
member of the religious group develops SARS and the number of new cases in Toronto 
appears to be decreasing.  The media and frontline health workers are beginning to feel 
some relief.  Hospitals begin to lift infection control precautions; personal protective 
equipment no longer has to be worn for all patients.  Visitors are allowed back into 
hospitals and staff begin returning to “duty as usual.”  Just as Canadians think they might 
be winning the battle against SARS, the WHO issues a travel advisory on April 23 
recommending that visitors to Toronto postpone all but the most essential travel.  On the 
same day at a press conference, Mayor Mel Lastman had this response to the travel 
advisory.  
I can tell you definitely we are in better shape today than we have been in 
a month…Where did the WHO come from?  Who did they see?  Who did 
they talk to?  Did they go to our hospitals, did they go to our clinics, did 
they go anywhere?  They sit somewhere, I understand Geneva, I don’t 
even know where the hell they come from, but Geneva or someplace and 
they make decisions…88   
There was concern by the United Nations over a small number of people in other 
countries who may have been exposed to SARS in Toronto.  The advisory, issued for a 
three-week period, is withdrawn on April 30 following visits to Geneva by the Ontario 
Health Minister Tony Clement and the Public Health Commissioner, Dr. Colin D’Cunha.  
Lifting the travel advisory comes with a promise from Canadian officials that intense 
screening of travelers to and from Canada to prevent the exportation of disease would 
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commence.89  By May 2, the cumulative total of SARS cases worldwide surpasses 6,000, 
and on May 14, Toronto is removed from the list of “areas with recent local 
transmission.”90 
C. CALM BEFORE THE NEXT BATTLE 
By WHO lifting the travel advisory to Toronto and removing the city from the list 
of local transmission, along with the decrease in new SARS cases, the community 
perceives that the outbreak is coming to an end.  The Premier lifts the emergency 
declaration on May 17 and previous hospital requirements for suspension of non-essential 
services; however, enhanced infection control practices continue.  The POC is also 
dismantled and the Ontario government assembles a panel of experts to study the 
response to SARS.  Most governmental and health officials are providing a unified 
message that SARS has been contained.  Public health begins to highlight the declining 
number of “active” SARS cases and the number of new cases instead of the cumulative 
numbers.  Health Canada issues bulletins weekly, and on May 21, reports that no 
Canadian had experienced onset of SARS symptoms for over a month.  It appears that a 
peak has been reached, with 140 probable, 178 suspect cases, and twenty-four Canadian 
deaths, all in Ontario.91  
Despite this good news, some potential cases of SARS remain under investigation 
because of the SARS-like symptoms’ similarity to those of other respiratory illnesses.  
These investigations often involve infectious disease specialists, public health physicians, 
Health Canada personnel, and the CDC.  A number of these investigations would result in 
the lack of epidemiological evidence to link people to a possible source of SARS 
infection.   
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Between late April and early May, three psychiatric patients develop pneumonia; 
all had been patients in York General Hospital.  One patient comes back to the hospital 
through the emergency department, is placed in the waiting area and is given a mask to 
wear.  The patient nervously paces the waiting area removing his mask frequently.  No 
epidemiological link to a source of SARS infection could be made to any of these 
patients.  However, all end up initially being placed in isolation and are managed as 
suspected SARS cases.  There are differing views by the investigation team as to whether 
the clinical picture was consistent with SARS, but without epidemiological links and with 
negative test results, a new cluster is ruled out.92   
During the same time, several elderly patients on the fourth floor of the York 
General Hospital had been fighting what was believed to be “post-operative lung 
infections.”  Apparently, infection spread over several weeks to other patients, visitors, 
and staff from these patients.  On April 29, an intensive care unit nurse from York 
General is admitted to Toronto General Hospital with respiratory illness.  She had taken 
care of one of the elderly patients who subsequently had died.  Serology test results are 
negative for SARS at first, but later come back positive.  This case would later be 
considered part of a growing SARS cluster in York General Hospital.93 
By mid-May, health workers in the emergency department who have taken care of 
family members of one of the elderly patients with symptoms similar to SARS, begin to 
grow anxious about the disease’s re-emergence.  Radiologists also express concern about 
suspicious x-rays.  Without epidemiological links and following public health guidance, 
the hospital’s infection control director and the vice president of medical affairs try to 
reassure these workers.  St. John’s Rehabilitation Hospital, meanwhile, received several 
transfers from other hospitals, including one from York General’s fourth floor.  Health 
workers from St. John’s inform senior management and Toronto Public Health that three 
patients are exhibiting symptoms of SARS.  Immediately, the hospital implements 
appropriate precautions.  In consultation with Toronto Public Health, it is agreed that 
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there has been a respiratory illness outbreak, but suggested that it was most likely not 
SARS.  This decision comes in the midst of public health still tracking down thirty to 
forty possible cases of SARS per day.  Toronto Public Health staff does visit the hospital 
and establishes that no epidemiological link can be identified.94   
D. SECOND BATTLE IS UNDERWAY 
Only one week after WHO declares Toronto free of local SARS transmission, 
health officials acknowledge that five people are under investigation for SARS and that 
maybe SARS has not been defeated.  This announcement is followed by a press release.  
Anyone who had visited St. John’s between May 9 and 20 or York General Hospital 
between May 13 and 23 is ordered into quarantine.  York General Hospital immediately 
stops new admissions except for those with SARS-like symptoms.  SARS has again 
spread to York General, St. John’s, Toronto General, and Scarborough Hospital.  The 
second battle against SARS is underway.   
Hospitals in the GTA are instructed to resume heightened infection-control 
procedures.  This time four hospitals are designated as SARS units and are given the 
name “SARS Alliance.”  The four hospitals include York General, Scarborough, St. 
Michael’s, and Sir William Osler Health Centre in Etobicoke.  Without a provincial 
emergency declaration, the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care takes the 
lead role with local public health in coordinating the outbreak response.  An operations 
center is established in the Ministry office.  A joint leadership role is assigned to two 
assistant deputy ministers to oversee the institutional and clinical functions.  However, 
several hospital administrators and a number of physicians ask that one person be placed 
in charge to avoid confusion.95 
Once again public health workers gear up for more investigations and interviews 
of contacts and suspected cases.  On May 22, health authorities in Canada inform the 
WHO of a new hospital-based cluster of five cases of acute respiratory illness in Toronto, 
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and by May 26, Toronto returns to the list of areas with recent local transmission.  It 
would later be realized that May 22 was the onset date of the last Ontario SARS case.  
The cumulative global total of SARS cases has now surpassed 8,000.96  Fatigue remains 
a problem for public health; however, this time the outbreak is smaller, the virus is better 
understood, and appropriate infection control procedures have already been established.  
By the end of May, forty-eight probable and twenty-five suspect cases have been 
identified in this second wave of the outbreak.  Refer to Figure 4.97  Like the first wave, 
transmission is primarily to other hospital patients, health workers, and family contacts.  
Another call for medical assistance is made, and several American infectious disease 
specialists and epidemiologists respond to Toronto.  Again, a private sole-source provider 
offers to assist physicians and nurses with the outbreak for a fee and provide services. 
During the course of the second wave, a medical student had to be placed in 
quarantine after potential exposure to SARS during an obstetrics rotation at York General 
Hospital.  Two days after he is released from quarantine, he develops symptoms while 
working at Mount Sinai Hospital, precipitating the quarantine of five women and their 
newborns and a number of health workers.  Another incident involves 1,700 high school 
students who were quarantined after a student at their school fell ill with SARS-like 
symptoms.98  By June 18, the global outbreak has entered its one hundredth day, and the 
number of new cases reported worldwide is dwindling to a handful.99 
On June 30, Nelia Laroza, a fifty-one-year-old nurse at North York General 
Hospital, becomes the first Canadian health worker to die from SARS.  A second nurse, 
Tecla Lin, dies on July 19, and a family physician, Nestor Santiaga Yanga, dies on 
August 13.100  Many health workers faced a fundamental conflict between personal 
safety and a professional obligation or duty to act.  Only a small number of health 
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workers refused to treat SARS patients or to work in SARS units.  Many willingly 
volunteer in the face of a mysterious disease that has no cure and is attacking the very 
infrastructure set-up to care for the sick.  The toll on health workers in Canada was high 
with more than one hundred ill and three deaths.101   
E. SARS DECLARED CONTAINED WORLDWIDE 
On July 2, Toronto is again removed from the list of areas with recent local 
transmission, and on July 5, the WHO declares that SARS outbreaks have been contained 
worldwide, but calls for continued surveillance. 102  Refer to Figure 5 for a timeline of 
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Adapted from Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Canada, “Descriptive Epidemiology of the SARS Outbreak -
Ontario, Canada 2003.”
 
Figure 5.   Timeline of Critical Events 
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SARS took root in hospital settings, where health care soldiers, unaware that a 
new disease had surfaced, and fighting to save the lives of patients, exposed themselves 
to an infectious agent without proper barrier and personal protection.  These initial 
outbreaks were characterized by chains of secondary transmission outside the health care 
setting, primarily affecting family members and close contacts.  This disease placed 
enormous burdens on the public health and health care system and exposed weaknesses 
in preparedness for and response to an infectious disease epidemic in Canada and around 
the world.104  As reported by the WHO, Canada had a total of 251 probable SARS cases 
and forty-three deaths.  Of the 251 probable cases, 109 were health care workers with 
three deaths.105 
Chapter IV provides an overview of Ontario’s governmental public health system, 
its governance, authorities, and jurisdictional boundaries.  The governmental response to 
the SARS epidemic including command and control, roles and responsibilities, alerting, 
communication, linkages, and information sharing is examined. 
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IV. GOVERNMENTAL PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE RESPONSE 
TO SARS 
A. DECAY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
In a 2002 report, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) referred to the “public health 
system” as a complex network of individuals and organizations that, when working 
together, can represent “what we as society do collectively to assure the conditions in 
which people can be healthy.”106  Public health systems around the world have 
deteriorated due to lack of investment of resources by governments over the last several 
decades.107  Due to this lack of investment, the Canadian public health system was ill-
prepared and ill-equipped to handle SARS.   
The alarm regarding the deterioration of public health in the United States was 
first raised by an IOM Report in 1988.  This report identified a number of systemic 
concerns, including disorganization, weak and unstable leadership, decreasing 
professional competence, outdated statutes, gaps in data collection and analysis, and 
inadequate financial support.108  Likewise, concerns regarding the general decline in 
public health capacity in Canada have been expressed since 1970.109  Mr. Justice Horace 
Krever, in his report, Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada (1997), 
recommended that the provincial and territorial ministers of health provide sufficient 
resources for public health services and in doing so stated: 
Public health departments in many parts of Canada do not have sufficient 
resources to carry out their duties.  They must have sufficient personnel 
and resources to conduct adequate surveillance of infectious diseases, to 
develop and implement measures to control the spread of infectious 
diseases, including those that are blood borne, and to communicate with  
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other public health authorities at both the federal and the provincial-
territorial levels.  Continued chronic underfunding of public health is a 
disservice to the Canadian public.110  
Specifically in Ontario, Mr. Justice Dennis O’Conner in May 2002 recommended 
an amendment to the Health Protection and Promotion Act (1990) to fill vacant positions 
immediately for medical officers of health, and that the Ontario Ministry of Health and 
Long Term Care conduct regular compliance assessments of local boards of health in 
meeting public health service requirements.111  Likewise, Senator Michael Kirby, in a 
report of the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and 
Technology (2002), stated:    
The Committee was told and is aware, however, that promotion, 
prevention, protection and population health activities do not claim 
anything like the close focus and high status that health care has in the 
eyes of the Canadian public and, obviously, public policy decision makers.  
Although it is clear that, collectively, the non-medical determinations of 
health have far greater impact on the health of the population than health 
care, the fact is that very positive outcomes from promotion, prevention, 
protection, and population health activities are generally visible only over 
the longer term, and thus they are less news worthy.  Because they are less 
likely to capture the attention of the general public, they are less attractive 
politically.112 
There seems to be complacency in the view of the public and policy makers 
regarding a high priority need for public health capacity at all levels of the Canadian 
government.  This may be due in part to the optimism that vaccinations, antibiotics, and 
clinical medicine are powerful soldiers strong enough to fight off any novel virus or 
infectious disease.  SARS has taught us that this optimism may be misguided, and that 
infectious diseases continue to be a significant public health threat.  For example, 
according to the U.S. surgeon general’s annual reports from the 1970s and 1980s, 
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tuberculosis was to be eradicated from the United States by 2000.  Instead, American 
public health officials are now dealing with multi-drug-resistant- and extensively-drug-
resistant forms of the disease. 
Whether naturally occurring or intentionally introduced, microbes can cause 
illness, disability, and death in individuals.  At the same time, entire populations, 
economies, and governments can be disrupted.  These microbes are resourceful and 
adaptable, giving them the potential to breach our greatest public health defenses.  
Factors relating to the environment, society, and our global interconnectedness enhance 
the likelihood of disease emergence and spread.  As well, it is imperative to deal with the 
twenty-first century threat of the intentional use of biological agents to do harm, human 
against human.113          
B. GOVERNMENTAL PUBLIC HEALTH IN ONTARIO 
Based on the Ontario Populations Projections by the Ministry of Finance (2008), 
the population in Ontario is 12.8 million, with approximately six million living in the 
Greater Ontario Area (GTA).  The GTA is comprised of Toronto and the regional 
municipalities of Durham, Halton, Peel, and York.  This area is projected to be the fastest 
growing region in Ontario.  The majority of SARS cases during the outbreak occurred in 
Toronto, and subsequently, the York, Durham, and Peel regions.  Refer to Figure 6 for 
distribution of SARS cases by health unit of residence.114   
There are approximately 140 public health units and departments at the municipal 
level that serve populations ranging from 600 to 2.4 million people.  Thirty-six local 
public health units serve Ontario.  This is where direct public health services are 
provided, including prevention and protection against infectious disease, and where 
frontline public health workers battle infectious disease outbreaks like SARS.  Each 
health unit is governed by a board of health, which is an autonomous corporation under 
the Health Protection and Promotion Act, (1990).  A medical officer of health, for most 
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health units, is responsible for administering programs and reports to the board.  During 
the SARS outbreak, there were thirty-seven public health units in the GTA engaged in the 












Adapted from Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, Canada, “Descriptive Epidemiology of the SARS Outbreak -
Ontario, Canada 2003.”
 
Figure 6.   SARS Cases by Health Unit of Residence 
C. PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO SARS IN ONTARIO 
In the SARS 2006 Commission Report, Ontario’s central provincial public health 
system is described as being woefully inadequate and unprepared.  
SARS showed that Ontario’s public health system is broken and needs to 
be fixed.  Despite the extraordinary efforts of many dedicated individuals 
and the strength of the many local public health units, the overall system 
proved woefully inadequate.  SARS showed Ontario’s central public 
health system to be unprepared, fragmented, poorly led, uncoordinated, 
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inadequately resourced, professionally impoverished, and generally 
incapable of discharging its mandate.  Ontario was fortunate that SARS 
was ultimately contained without widespread community transmission or 
further hospital spread, sickness and death. SARS was contained only by 
the heroic efforts of dedicated front line health care and public health 
workers and the assistance of extraordinary managers and medical 
advisors.  They did so with little assistance from the central provincial 
public health system that should have been there to help them.116 
The litany of problems identified during the governmental public health system’s 
response in Ontario during the SARS epidemic should be used as a basis for identifying 
applicable recommendations for improving public health preparedness in the United 
States.  This chapter focuses on system issues, not on those who worked within the 
system.  What did go right in a system where so many things went wrong was the 
extraordinary work and dedication of the public health and health care soldiers who 
fought SARS.117   
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
In Ontario, there is no authorization under law for “who’s in charge,” and 
therefore, no clear line of accountability for managing a public health emergency. 
Clarification in command and control for the operational response to SARS did not begin 
to emerge until March 26, 2003 when the premier of Ontario declared SARS a provincial 
emergency under the authority of the Provincial Emergency Plans Act.  This declaration 
activated the Provincial Operations Centre (POC) and brought representatives from 
provincial ministries to the response table.  Concurrently, each ministry activated its own 
ministry advisory group (MAG).  Initially, there was confusion and frustration between 
the POC and the MAGs.  The POC was staffed by individuals who had broad emergency 
response backgrounds. The MAGs, on the other hand, were staffed by individuals who 
had greater knowledge about infectious diseases, but had limited experience with SARS.   
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These groups were, at the time of the outbreak, informally functioning and co-located.  
Once the declaration occurred, it took seventy-two hours for both groups to be situated in 
one physical location, at the POC.   
Prior to the SARS outbreak, the POC had never been activated.118  Staffing for 
the POC and MAGs became immediately problematic as only one individual was being 
assigned per group when 24/7 staffing was being required.  There was little infrastructure 
designed to support the MAGs and assist with the operations at the POC.  As well, a 
credentialing process was absent from the staffing pattern for the POC.   
Another point of confusion was the role of the commissioner of public safety and 
the commissioner of public health or chief medical officer of health at the POC.  It was 
unclear which position was ultimately in charge and responsible for managing the public 
health emergency.  The command structure of the POC prior to SARS had not 
contemplated sharing responsibility with a “lead” ministry, such as the Ontario Ministry 
of Health and Long Term Care, or a chief medical officer of health.  The perception was 
that the responsibilities of these two positions were duplicative and it was unclear which 
position was ultimately in charge. 
In addition, under the Health Protection and Promotion Act, local medical 
officers of health were responsible for the response to SARS.  It was the province, 
however,—the Public Health Branch of the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term 
Care—to whom the local public health units looked for guidance.  Many medical officers 
felt there was no coordinated effort to facilitate the SARS response at the local level.  A 
number of health workers informed the SARS Commission that the Public Health Branch 
of the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care had over time become 
dysfunctional internally and had poor relationships with local public health units.  When 
SARS appeared, leadership seemed to be absent from the branch. 
                                                 




E. ALERTING AND COMMUNICATION 
In general, communication about SARS came from various agencies within the 
system with no clearly identified source.  Information often came with conflicting or out-
of-date recommendations.  For example, information came from the public health 
commissioner, local public health units, the POC, the Ontario Hospital Association, the 
Ontario Medical Association, the Public Health Branch of the Ontario Ministry of Health 
and Long Term Care, the Ministry of Public Safety and Security, and Health Canada.119  
In addition, multiple spokespersons from multiple agencies all interacting with the media 
produced conflicting information and reduced the credibility and confidence the public 
and front-line workers in the public health system had for those in charge. 
Infrastructure, procedures, and roles and responsibilities for distributing health 
alerts were non-existent.  Local health units, physicians, ambulance services, hospitals, 
long-term care facilities, community health centers, and other sector responders identified 
the need for a comprehensive alerting system, and clearly identified roles and 
responsibilities for information sharing at all levels of government.  In addition, 
information shared needed to be categorized by public information, clinician information, 
and other response partner information.  For example, public health and health care 
workers indicated that no system existed prior to the SARS outbreak for communication 
of routine and emergent infectious disease alerts from Health Canada to the operational 
levels of the system (i.e., hospitals, long-term care facilities, ambulance services, clinics, 
and physicians).  Hospital administrators indicated they had no direct communication 
from Health Canada regarding SARS.120  Also reported was the lack of feedback or 
information sharing regarding the interaction between Health Canada and the WHO.  
Health Canada departed from the WHO’s international recommendations on SARS 
diagnostic criteria until later in the outbreak and failed to communicate evidence-based 
reasons for such a decision.  This created credibility and trust concerns between Health 
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Canada and attending physicians across the province.  According to the author Steven M. 
R. Covey, trust is a critical leadership competency that is actionable and can be created.  
Without trust, the quality of communication may be diminished leading to inefficiencies 
in emergency response.   
There is one thing that is common to every individual, relationship, team, 
family, organization, nation, economy, and civilization throughout the 
world—one thing which, if removed, will destroy the most powerful 
government, the most successful business, the most thriving economy, the 
most influential leadership, the greatest friendship, the strongest character, 
the deepest love……That one thing is trust.121 
It was not until May 29, 2003 that Health Canada announced full alignment of its 
criteria for diagnosis of SARS with that of the WHO.122  Had “trust” among Health 
Canada, public health, and health care providers been previously established and 
transparent communications achieved, improvements may have been realized in 
identifying, diagnosing and reporting SARS cases more efficiently and effectively.   
Local public health units have the responsibility to collect infectious disease 
information for reportable disease at the individual case level.  Health care providers are 
required to report to local public health units; however, there is no clear responsibility for 
local public health units to provide information back to health care providers.  Health 
care providers thought they would receive SARS information from local public health 
units; however, the public health units felt they could not share case information due to 
confidentiality restrictions.  In addition, local public health units did not have sufficient 
resources to do so, and they did not believe it was their responsibility.123  Health care 
providers also perceived that local public health units were paying more attention to 
community contact tracing and quarantine.  This diminished the importance of and actual 
interaction with hospitals to help identify how their practices might be contributing to  
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the further spread of SARS.124  Health Canada does not have a clear legal mandate to 
require provinces to share health surveillance information with each other and the federal 
government.125  
Not only was communication a concern among higher level public health system 
players and between public health and health care, but also in regard to information 
sharing with other sectors, such as emergency medical services.126  Hospitals reported 
receiving inquiries from multiple public health units for the same information on the 
same patient.  When hospitals informed public health of this duplication, they were 
informed that public health had no means to share information across public health units 
or with other sectors in aggregate form.127  It was also identified that local medical 
officers of health did not regularly participate in arranged conference calls to share 
information and coordinate response activities.  This further contributed to the lack of 
information sharing and resulted in conflicting messages being passed on to local health 
units and hospitals.128 
Toronto Public Health (TPH) did establish a SARS hotline with over 200 staff 
providing health information and counseling, case and contact identification, and 
consultation on emerging issues in affected health care settings and communities.  The 
hotline received over 300,000 calls with a peak of 47,567 calls in a single day.129  The 
majority of calls were related to illness, exposures, emergency supply needs, quarantine 
compliance, business failure, loss of income, racial profiling, and fear of being shunned.  
This hotline provided an avenue for the public to get information, however, it did not 
contribute to enhancing communication between public health and health care. 
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F. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The SARS outbreak was moderate in size, in part because some effective public 
health and health care actions were taken to contain its spread.  In addition, the causative 
agent was actually less contagious than other more common respiratory and enteric 
viruses.130  The containment of SARS relied heavily on the application of public health 
prevention and control measures rooted in nineteenth century science.131  Effective 
implementation of prevention and control measures depends heavily upon public health 
system capacity and capability at the local and provincial levels.  It also relies upon well-
defined emergency response roles and responsibilities at all levels of government.   
During the initial battle with SARS, medical workers responsible for directly 
treating people infected with SARS and implementing infection control measures were 
unclear on the roles and jurisdictional responsibilities of Health Canada, the Ontario 
Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, and the local public health units.  For example, 
it was unclear who was to serve as the contact with the WHO; who was responsible for 
keeping the overall system informed; who was responsible for developing and issuing 
press releases; who was to provide advice on appropriate infection control procedures; 
and who was providing clinical and case definitions for SARS.  Frontline medical 
workers indicated that these issues appeared to be a source of debate between the Ontario 
Ministry of Health and Long Term Care and Health Canada.  Clarity in roles and 
jurisdictional responsibilities and greater communication among Health Canada, the 
Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, and local public health units could have 
eliminated some of this confusion.  Some frontline medical workers referred to 
“fragmentation” in the system, “silos,” and “chaos” in describing the lack of clarity in 
roles and responsibilities.132 
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The main roles and responsibilities of the TPH included disease surveillance and 
reporting, case investigation and management, identification and quarantine of contacts, 
health risk assessment, and providing consultation and technical assistance to health care 
providers regarding infection control.  The TPH also played an important role in public 
information and education at the local level.  These activities were overseen by the 
associate medical officer of health under the leadership of the medical officer of health 
and provincial public health officials.  Approximately 700 TPH staff engaged in the 
SARS response between mid-March and the end of June.  Nearly 400 workers were 
assigned to SARS on any given day.133 
In order to sustain the TPH response during the SARS epidemic, public health 
officials and physicians had to be brought in from other public health units from around 
the country and from the federal government.  Most were assigned to case management, 
contact tracing, and epidemiology teams.  These teams worked seven days a week from 
8:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. on two shifts.134  
1. Contact Tracing and Case Management 
The identification of people potentially exposed to a case of SARS or other 
infectious disease is called contact tracing.  It involves the monitoring and evaluation of 
those exposed.  Contract tracing is also critical in order to reduce the spread of disease 
and provides a means to focus containment and control efforts on people who are at high 
risk.  The process includes identifying people prior to or early in the course of their 
illness, and implementing appropriate control measures before those individuals can 
spread the disease to others.  Quarantine of exposed people was a control measure used 
during the SARS epidemic.  Effective use of quarantine reduces the interval between the 
onset of symptoms and implementation of control measures, thus reducing the number of 
exposures, and subsequently, the number of cases. 
                                                 




A dedicated phone line was established for health care providers to report cases to 
the province.  Case management teams investigated all reports by obtaining detailed 
histories of symptoms, laboratory test results, and epidemiological linkages with other 
SARS cases.  Preliminary determinations were made from three options: 1) the individual 
met the definition of a probable or suspect case, 2) the individual did not meet the case 
definition, or 3) the individual remained under investigation.  Since SARS symptoms 
resembled those similar to influenza and other respiratory illnesses, the disease was often 
difficult to diagnose.  It was labor intensive to rule out SARS cases.  Since the final 
decision had major implications for the affected person, close contacts, and health care 
settings, each case investigation took an extraordinary amount of time and effort.  The 
case management teams at the TPH held daily case conferences consulting with 
infectious disease experts and worked joint investigations with other public health units.   
During the outbreak, approximately 2,000 case investigations were conducted, 
each taking an average of nine hours to complete.135  All potential cases were contacted 
daily to update their clinical status until a final diagnosis could be made.  In addition, 
TPH placed staff in hospitals with SARS cases to facilitate public health management.  
For each case, a detailed list was developed outlining activities for ten days prior to onset 
of symptoms and while they were symptomatic.  At-risk contacts were identified and 
decisions made regarding isolation and quarantine. 
2. Follow-up of Case Contacts 
Contacts that were not symptomatic were placed in quarantine for a ten-day 
period (incubation period).  Thermometers and masks were delivered to people in 
quarantine and provisions made for delivery of essential goods.  Each contact placed in 
quarantine was telephoned at least once a day to ensure quarantine was maintained.  Over 
23,300 people were identified as possible contacts, and of those, 13,374 were placed in 
voluntary quarantine.136  Cooperation and compliance was high, with only twenty-seven 
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mandatory orders being issued for those who did not initially comply.137  Although not 
used in Toronto, law enforcement was used in Guangdong province to track down 
contacts of cases who then received follow-up for the ten days after exposure.138 
3. Epidemiology 
Information collected by the case management teams was delivered to 
epidemiological teams daily to update surveillance databases and for submission to the 
provincial government.  Limited disease surveillance information was shared with 
infectious disease specialists, emergency room physicians, and other Ontario public 
health units.  Although surveillance information was shared, there was no standard policy 
or mechanism to share this information to ensure those who needed it received it.  The 
volume of information generated from public health investigations far exceeded previous 
experience in TPH.  The fourteen-year-old reportable disease surveillance system in place 
at the time of the SARS epidemic was not robust enough to support case management 
and follow-up with the volume of cases under investigation and people in quarantine.139  
TPH had to rely on an old-fashioned paper based system which made collection of data 
inefficient, duplicative, and time consuming.     
G. LINKAGES BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE   
Confusion seemed to exist regarding the relationships between the public health 
units and hospitals and other health care settings.  The public health units had to report 
through local governments, leading to challenges with work that needed to be done 
directly with the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care.  This contributed to a 
lack of information sharing, coordination, and duplication of effort by the public health 
units.  Both public health and hospital workers indicated that there was inconsistency in 
outbreak management procedures across public health units in the GTA.140  In part, these 
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challenges may be due to the absence of clearly defined roles and responsibilities, 
policies, and guidelines for the public health units in the broader health care system.  As 
well, these challenges may be attributed to weak links between the local public health 
units and the Public Health Branch of the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term 
Care.   
Direct public health services are traditionally provided and usually best governed 
at the local level.  Both public health and health workers, however, have expressed a need 
to consider a broader provincial approach redistributing work and clearly identifying 
roles and responsibilities of local public health units and the provincial Public Health 
Branch of the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care.  This could also provide 
clearer responsibility and accountability for leadership on the part of the Ontario Ministry 
of Health and Long Term Care.141   
H. HOSPITALS 
Dealing with a novel infectious disease with no diagnostic criteria, etiology, or 
treatment modality creates great apprehension on the part of health care providers.  It also 
creates challenges for hospitals and clinics in responding to illness caused by an unknown 
infectious virus.  The clinical signs and symptoms of SARS are not sufficiently distinct 
from other respiratory illnesses to allow for a reliable differential diagnosis.  However, a 
combination of clinical and epidemiological findings can provide the necessary clues for 
the diagnosis of probable SARS.142  For this reason, it is critical that public health and 
health care have the capacity and capability to share information efficiently and 
effectively about infectious disease cases, epidemiological links, trends, and findings. 
Many SARS patients required hospitalization due to the severity of illness.  Due 
to the possibility of airborne transmission, these patients required negative pressure 
isolation rooms or were placed in specially adapted units.  Hospitals quickly realized that 
the capacity for negative pressure isolation rooms and the number of staff adequately 
                                                 
141 Health Canada, “Learning from SARS: Renewal of Public Health in Canada,” 144. 




trained to work in these areas was not sufficient to deal with SARS.  This led to grouping 
patients in individual rooms or on the same hospital floor in order to concentrate infection 
control efforts and resources.  This strategy proved effective in many settings during the 
epidemic.143        
An infection control program in most hospitals in the GTA was not a priority at 
the time of the SARS outbreak.  In addition, there was no functioning regional infectious 
disease program being led by the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care.144  
What did exist at the time of the outbreak was an informal network of infection control 
practitioners from a few hospitals who were sharing information.  A few hospitals were 
fortunate to learn about the outbreak through this small informal network.  Another 
identified gap in the hospital response was the lack of ongoing infectious disease 
surveillance—both routine and emergent—that would have better prepared hospitals for a 
possible infectious disease outbreak. 
I. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS  
Ontario had no pandemic influenza plan in place when SARS emerged.145  Since 
these diseases are similar, having such a plan in place may have reduced confusion about 
roles and responsibilities, clarified command and control, and provided direction for 
alerting and information sharing during the SARS outbreak.  It may have also provided 
the foundation for expanding the SARS response in a phased “ramping up” approach to 
ensure the response was commensurate with the scope and the extent of the expanding 
outbreak.  A phased approach may have provided guidance on looking forward regarding 
further hospital spread, community spread, and greater spread across the country.  Dr. 
James Young, commissioner of Public Security, told the SARS Commission: 
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We had no idea at that point in time if or how to control with certainty the 
SARS outbreak.  The scope of what was happening, in fact, was 
increasing.  We were having more cases by the day, not fewer and there 
was no end in sight and that was the experience, in fact, at that point in 
time, in Hong Kong, in Taiwan and in Beijing, as it started, that it got 
bigger and bigger and no one was bringing it under control at that point in 
time.146 
The outbreak had primarily been hospital based; however, a number of questions 
were being asked.  Would the virus spread beyond the hospital setting?  Would the virus 
spread to the community?  Would the virus spread farther to other communities, or to 
other provinces, or across Canada?  If the outbreak did get bigger, how would the public 
health and health care system respond?  Did this virus have the virulence to spark a 
pandemic in Canada?  Faced with these questions, an ad hoc science committee at the 
provincial level was assembled on April 2, 2003 to develop possible scenarios for the 
expansion of the public health response to SARS.  It was during these ad hoc committee 
meetings that Ontario’s Pandemic Influenza Plan was requested, and the committee 
learned Ontario had no plan.  A member of the science committee from British Columbia 
quickly obtained copies of their Pandemic Influenza and Bioterrorism Emergency plans 
for use by the committee.  Three worst-case scenarios were formulated to expand 
response plans for SARS spreading from the hospital setting to the community, across the 
GTA, and into other provinces.  Fortunately, SARS was ultimately contained and 
community spread was limited.  If this had not been the case, these scenarios would have 
been crucial to the ongoing response and control of the SARS epidemic. 
Although a pandemic influenza plan was not in place at the time SARS emerged, 
it was under development.  This planning process facilitated some relationship building 
which supported the response.  Some argue that this was not the case, since the draft plan 
was not offered to the ad hoc science committee, nor had others outside the Ontario 
Ministry of Health and Long Term Care seen or participated in its development.  Calls 
from the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care for the development of local 
pandemic influenza plans began as early as 1999 and commitments had been made by the 
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ministry to do the same; however, little progress had been made on a province-wide 
plan.147  Without a provincial level plan, it is difficult to develop and implement local 
plans.  Bringing the ad hoc science committee together with experts from across the 
country proved invaluable as members brought their own expertise, public health 
emergency plans, and structures that could be adapted quickly in Ontario. 
The theme regarding the lack of federal, provincial, and local roles and 
responsibilities and the lack of “pre-planned machinery” for public health preparedness 
continued to surface.  Another obstacle against the fight on SARS was the lack of 
linkages between public health and hospitals—linkages that should have been in place if 
a pandemic influenza plan had been developed and implemented.148  These linkages may 
have provided more direction on alerting, roles and responsibilities, and information 
sharing among public health, hospitals, and other health care settings. 
Emergency response systems had to be designed from scratch.  The outbreak was 
managed, out of necessity, around the Public Health Branch of the Ontario Ministry of 
Health and Long Term Care rather than through it.  Key operational units had to be put 
together “on the fly,” with individual experts recruited from the field, such as the science 
committee.  In addition, there was no functioning epidemiological unit at the ministry 
level at the time of SARS.  
Surveillance emerged as another area of fragmented responsibility.  Local public 
health was geared toward implementing prevention and control strategies.  Provincial 
public health leaders did not take on the role of a central information collection point or 
facilitating the analysis of the culminating data.  There did not seem to be an entity with 
the overall jurisdictional authority or leadership to collect and analyze information, 
identify and communicate findings of the analysis, send alerts about unusual clusters of 
cases, and develop and implement prevention and control strategies.149  The surveillance  
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system in place was disease-specific and could not be quickly adapted to deal with SARS 
or any new disease.  There was no structure established to collect, analyze, and report 
information.   
Governmental public health in Canada—specifically Ontario—struggled with a 
number of key system-preparedness capacity and capability problems in response to the 
SARS epidemic, including the following: 
• conflicting authority between levels of government, creating confusion 
about who was in charge of the outbreak overall; 
• limited leadership in leading outbreak response; 
• weak capability for sending alerts and notifications (risk communication 
non-existent or fragmented); 
• inconsistent public information and education; 
• no formal agreements in place to share public health and health care 
practitioners across jurisdictions;  
• limited availability to national public health strategies, emergency 
preparedness and outbreak management plans; 
• critical underinvestment in public health infrastructure, weak surveillance 
system reporting, and analytical epidemiological resources; and 
• poor linkages between the government and frontline practitioners, and 
between public health, health care, and other sectors. 
A number of systemic deficiencies have been identified regarding the 
governmental public health system’s response to SARS.  This epidemic placed 
unprecedented demands on the public health and health care system.  It challenged public 
health capacity at all governmental levels and created great uncertainty in the clinical 
setting regarding diagnosis and treatment of SARS patients.  Public health and health care 
workers in Ontario did a remarkable job controlling the spread of SARS, despite the 
heightened personal risk for contracting a new and dangerous infectious disease while 
working under great psychological and physical demands. 
Prior to SARS, potential harm to the health of Canadians from weaknesses in the 
governmental public health system infrastructure had been growing; however, not to a 
level that sounded an alarm loud enough to get the attention of policy makers.  It took a 
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novel infectious disease like SARS, killing over forty Canadians, making hundreds more 
ill, paralyzing the health care system, placing over 13,000 GTA residents in quarantine, 
and producing an economic backlash for policy makers to recognize the critical need to 
invest in the public health system.  In 2003, the National Advisory Committee on SARS 
and Public Health renounced the complacency of policy makers to invest adequately in 
Ontario’s public health system. 
SARS is simply the latest in a series of recent bellwethers for the fragile 
state of Canada’s ….public health system.  The pattern is now familiar.  
Public health is taken for granted until disease outbreaks occur, 
whereupon a brief flurry of lip service leads to minimal investments and 
little real change in public health infrastructure or priorities.  This cycle 
must end.150  
Ontario has not responded to past wake-up calls for investing in public health.  
Systemic problems have been identified in the past and many of the same systemic flaws 
that emerged during SARS were preventable.  Given the appropriate political will, the 
Ontario provincial and federal government must make the financial investment and long-
term commitment to the public health security of its citizenry.   
There are important lessons to be learned from the SARS epidemic that should be 
used toward improving public health preparedness in the United States.  Chapter V 
provides an overview of the lessons to be learned from SARS in Ontario and outlines 
improvements made by the government toward revitalizing its public health system. 
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V. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM SARS IN ONTARIO AND 
IMPROVEMENTS MADE 
The issues and challenges faced during the SARS epidemic in Canada were 
enormous.  However, in the end, SARS was controlled by front-line health care workers, 
public health specialists, and scientists who had the courage to battle an unknown 
invader.  This was despite personal risk while taking strong prevention and control 
measures that worked in the end.  The personal sacrifice was great; two nurses and a 
doctor died from SARS in Toronto alone, and almost half of those who got SARS were 
health workers on the job.  Toronto lost hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue due to 
conventions and meetings being cancelled.  Tourists changed vacation plans and avoided 
the GTA.  Many Chinese businesses and restaurants were affected by irrational public 
fears of SARS.  The estimated impact on the Canadian economy was over $2.5 billion.151  
Although lives and revenue have been lost, the response to SARS and lessons to be 
learned provide an opportunity for improving public health emergency preparedness in 
the United States.  This idea was emphasized by Dato Chua Jui Meng, Minister of Health, 
Malaysia at a 2003 meeting of the World Health Organization (WHO).  
There is a word in the Chinese dictionary for CRISIS.  It is WEI JI i.e. the 
combination of 2 words, danger and opportunity.  Inherent in a crisis and 
depending upon how we respond to it can be found the mother lode of 
OPPORTUNITY.  All that has been done across the globe against SARS 
by humanity collectively must become the MODEL for man’s response to 
new microbes that will surely threaten HUMANITY in the FUTURE.  
Therein lies the OPPORTUNITY for all of us.152   
Canada’s ability to fight an epidemic such as SARS was tied more closely to the 
strengths of the public health system’s infrastructure than to the general capacity of the 
publicly-funded personal health service system.  SARS demonstrated the need for greater 
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linkages between the public health and health care settings, especially in the areas of 
information sharing, communication, alerting, disease surveillance, and detection, and 
infection control.  In addition, SARS has helped the public health sector recognize the 
importance of and need for comprehensive emergency planning and capacity building.  It 
has also helped to establish clearer lines of authority and identifying roles and 
responsibilities by sectors at the different levels of government.153  Most importantly, 
SARS was an alarm finally heard by the government, policy makers, and the public 
regarding the need for and importance of a robust public health system. 
A. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIVE REPORTS 
There are many lessons to be learned from SARS. Unfortunately, many previous 
lessons had not actually been generalized or institutionalized.  Previous alarms regarding 
the need for a strong public health system were simply ignored.  The response to the 
SARS outbreak rocked a major segment of Ontario’s health system for many weeks and 
it quickly consumed the public health system.  Between 2002 and 2004, there were many 
reports characterizing the state of Canada’s public health system, most of which were 
initiated by federal or provincial governments.  Below is a list of four major reports that 
highlight key issues regarding weaknesses in Canada’s public health system and lessons 
to be learned from SARS.  One report was published prior to SARS and three following 
the epidemic. 
• The Health of Canadians – The Federal Role, final report on the state of 
the health care system in Canada by the Standing Senate Committee on 
Social Affairs Science and Technology, chaired by the Honorable Michael 
J. L. Kirby, October 2002; 
• Renewal of Public Health in Canada, a report of the National Advisory 
Committee on SARS and Public Health, chaired by Dr. David Naylor, 
Dean of Medicine at the University of Toronto, October 2003; 
• For the Public’s Health: A Plan of Action, final report of the Ontario 
Expert Panel on SARS and Infectious Disease Control, chaired by Dr. 
David Walker, Dean, Faculty of Health Sciences and Director of School of 
Medicine, Queen’s University, April 2004; and  
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• SARS and Public Health in Ontario, interim report of the SARS 
Commission, chaired by the Honorable Mr. Justice Archie Campbell, 
April 2004. 
1. Kirby Report 
This report was published prior to the SARS epidemic.  The way in which 
primary medical care is generally delivered in Canada was examined.  A variety of 
weaknesses were identified; for example, fragmentation of care and services, lack of 
importance given to health promotion, and a misalignment of incentives that promotes 
disease prevention.  The Kirby Report also highlighted infectious disease trends that 
threaten the health of Canadians.  Some of these include the potential increase in the 
spread of infectious diseases through environmental changes, travel, and migration.  Also 
discussed were behavioral changes, particularly high-risk sexual practices and drug use, 
as potential causes for an increase in disease spread.  Public resistance to immunization 
and anti-microbial resistance in infectious organisms were also covered.  The committee 
put forth a strong recommendation for the federal government to ensure strong leadership 
and provide additional resources to sustain, better coordinate, and integrate the public 
health system in Canada.154  
2. Naylor Report 
Systemic deficiencies and weaknesses were the focus of the Naylor report.  
Lessons to be learned from the SARS response included poor relationships among 
different levels of government and between health care and public health.  A lack of 
surge capacity in the clinical and public health system was identified, and getting timely 
access to laboratory testing and results proved to be problematic.  Protocols for data 
collection and sharing among the different levels of government and with other sectors 
were absent.  Epidemiological capacity was minimal and coordination of outbreak 
management across jurisdictions led to duplication of effort and inefficiencies.  Infection 
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control policies and procedures were outdated and the technical assistance and 
consultation provided by public health was fragmented.  Linkages between public health 
and medical care services were determined to be weak.155   
Key recommendations of the Naylor report included: creating a Canadian Agency 
for Public Health with a chief public health officer; the development of a national health 
strategy; creating a public health partnership program to build capacity in public health at 
the local level; and developing a national strategy to renew and sustain the public health 
workforce. 
3. Walker Report 
The Walker report proposed a blueprint for strengthening the health care system 
and responding to emerging health risks and future emergencies that included over fifty-
three recommendations.  One overarching recommendation was that federal and 
provincial efforts to improve public health must be coordinated and complementary.156  
In addition, this report provides a number of lessons to be learned that focus on local 
public health activities.   
Like the Naylor report recommending a Canadian public health agency, the 
Walker Report recommended the establishment of a public health agency for Ontario.  In 
addition, the report provided recommendations for a revitalization strategy to increase 
capacity and training for public health workers and to restructure the existing provincial-
municipal cost sharing agreements.  Development and implementation of a regional 
infection control network and establishment of a provincial infection control committee 
was recommended.  In addition, infection control policies and procedures need to be 
updated.   
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A focus on emergency preparedness was highlighted by recommending the 
creation of an Office of Health Emergency Preparedness.  This office would be 
responsible for the development and dissemination of emergency plans.  In addition, this 
office should develop medical response teams and facilitate rapid deployment of health 
care personnel in the province to address surge capacity.157   
Communications was also a focus of the Walker Report recommending the 
development of a Public Health Alert Network (PHAN) with the capacity to reach all key 
stakeholders in an emergency.  At the time of the outbreak, Ontario did not have a 
communication infrastructure to alert or share public health information.  Another lesson 
to be learned was the need for a comprehensive disease surveillance system that could be 
integrated with other systems across local, provincial, and federal agencies.  A need was 
also identified to implement information sharing protocols that prescribe who is 
responsible for sharing what information and when. 
4. Campbell Report  
In the post SARS era, the Campbell report offered twenty-one principles for 
health care reform, and of the four reports, was most critical of Ontario’s central public 
health system, describing it as “fragmented, uncoordinated, poorly led, and inadequately 
resourced.”158  Based on the identified public health system weakness, key lessons to be 
learned included the need for emergency planning, improvements in public health 
infrastructure, and strengthening links between hospitals and other health care settings.  A 
top priority was to ensure that public health has the necessary resources for safe water, 
food, and protection against infectious diseases.  Campbell’s report also highlighted the 
need for creating an Ontario Centre for Disease Control independent of the Ministry of 
Health and the need to support a chief medical officer. 
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B. COMMON LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Kirby, Naylor, Walker, and Campbell reports share a common vision for the 
renewal of the public health system in Canada.  This vision comes with three critical 
overarching needs: 1) a commitment to providing and sustaining increased resources for 
rebuilding and maintaining the public health infrastructure; 2) improving federal-
provincial and interagency cooperation and collaboration; and 3) preparedness.  Three of 
the four reports also identified critical lessons to be learned in the area of communication 
and information sharing.  This resulted in calling for the development of a public health 
communication strategy to be used during public health emergencies.  Likewise, three of 
the four reports called for improving the federal and Ontario infectious disease 
surveillance systems in order to collect, analyze, detect, and distribute information about 
infectious diseases more efficiently. 
To many in the first responder community, these themes may not come as a 
surprise.  For example, issues with communication, planning, resource management, and 
coordination are problems that have been cited before in after-action reviews and reports 
following other disasters.  Following the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, the After 
Action Report: Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing (2003) highlighted incident 
command and coordination as being weak in numerous local, state, and federal agencies.  
In The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned (2006), flaws were 
identified in overlapping roles and responsibilities in multiple federal agency command 
posts and a lack of coordination.  Following the September 11 attacks in 2001, The 9/11 
Commission Report (2004) identified problems in command, control, and 
communications, recommending the need for national adoption of an incident command 
system and a unified command.  Despite the documentation of many lessons from other 
disasters, similar re-occurring weaknesses continue to surface and similar mistakes seem 
to be repeated in other disasters.  Reviews and reports of disaster response provide for the 
identification of lessons; however, actually learning from these lessons and making 
“change” may be more challenging.   
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C. PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS IN CANADA  
Canada has initiated improvements in its public health system since the SARS 
epidemic by shaping a new federal approach to address systemic weaknesses.  This 
approach is based on three pillars: 
• building a new federal public health agency; 
• creating a chief public health officer (CPHO) for Canada; and 
• building a Pan-Canadian public health network.159 
Under this new approach, all three levels of government share responsibility for 
public health.  The federal effort is led by the new Public Health Agency of Canada 
(PHAC) and has the responsibility for communicating with foreign governments and 
multilateral health agencies.  Provincial and territorial efforts are led by chief medical 
officers of health and the public health workers have “front-line” responsibility for 
responding to public health emergencies in their respective jurisdictions.  Local efforts 
are led by a public health officer and public health workers who engage in routine public 
health prevention and health promotion programs.  All three levels of government share 
in the responsibility for public health policy, monitoring health threats, and education.  In 
addition, each level still has some form of responsibility for public health regulation. 
In May 2004, the Minister of State for Public Health, Dr. Carolyn Bennett 
announced details about the new PHAC, which by statute would be linked, but remain 
separate from Health Canada.  Minister Bennett announced plans for appointment of a 
CPHO.  Dr. David Butler-Jones is PHAC’s first CPHO and is still serving in this 
capacity.160  Health Canada is responsible for helping Canadians maintain and improve 
their health, and the PHAC has been created to deliver on the Canadian government’s 
commitment to help protect the health and safety of all Canadians.  PHAC’s focus is on 
public health emergencies, infectious disease outbreaks, and preventing chronic diseases.  
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Dr. David Butler-Jones is based out of Winnipeg, where Canada’s only level-four 
microbiology laboratory for human health is located.  This is the location for coordination 
of infectious disease functions and epidemiology, and has critical functions nationally 
and internationally in the event of an infectious disease outbreak.  The CPHO also has 
offices in Ottawa responsible for collaboration and coordination with other departments 
and sectors in emergency preparedness and response to national public health threats and 
emergencies. 
During the same announcement, Minister Bennett launched the creation of six 
National Collaborating Centres for Public Health that reside across the country with an 
initial investment of $15 million over two years.161  Each centre has a specific public 
health focus.  The six centres include: 
• Atlantic – focus is on determinants of health and studying how social 
factors affect health; 
• Quebec – focus is on public policy and risk assessments studying the 
impact of public policy on Canadians’ health; 
• Ontario – focus is on infrastructure, info-structure, new tools development, 
and studying how public health information can best be gathered and 
utilized to minimize health risks; 
• Prairies – focus is on infectious diseases studying the present and future 
risks of emerging and re-emerging diseases;  
• British Columbia – focus is on environmental health studying the effects 
of the environment on human health. 
• Aboriginal Health – focus is on studying the health disparities and factors 
that exist for Canada’s aboriginal peoples in urban, rural, and remote 
communities. 
Lastly, this announcement identified Winnipeg as home to the International 
Centre for Infectious Diseases (ICID) with a focus on research, training, and 
commercialization and innovation in addressing the threat and impacts of infectious  
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diseases.  The ICID is responsible to ensure that collaborative mechanisms exist to allow 
university and government scientists to work together more closely, and to facilitate the 
commercialization of their discoveries.162 
D. INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC HEALTH 
In 2004, the Canadian government made a significant investment totaling $965 
million toward the new PHAC, associated centres, and programs to bolster the 
infrastructure of Canada’s public health system.  Table 2 provides a breakdown of 
investments.163 





$40 million Maintaining the preparedness measures established as a result of the SARS epidemic. 
$30 million Modernizing the facilities and supporting additional research at federal microbiology 
laboratories including Health Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory. 
$16 million Contributing to growing a skilled public health workforce. 
$15 million Creating the National Collaborating Centres for Public Health. 
$12 million Creating health emergency response teams to be mobilized and provide medical services 
in the event of an emergency. 
$12 million  Creating the Public Health Agency of Canada. 
$10 million Strengthening surveillance standards and data collection in collaboration with provincial, 
territorial, and other stakeholders. 
$10 million Strengthening linkages with international public health organizations. 
$10 million Protecting the health of First Nations and Inuit communities. 
$8 million Implementing the Emergency Stockpile System. 
$2 million Supporting the Pan-Canadian Public Health Network System. 
$165 million Subtotal – committed over a two-year period  
$100 million Investing in Canada Health Infoway to assess, develop and implement a real-time public 
health disease surveillance system. 
$400 million Investing in the provinces and territories over the next three years to support a national 
immunization strategy and relieve stress on provincial and territorial public health 
systems that worked during the SARS epidemic. 
$300 million Purchasing of vaccines by provinces and territories on a per capita basis. 
$800 million Subtotal – includes ongoing funding on a per capita basis 
$965 million TOTAL 
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March 2008 marked five years since the beginning of the SARS epidemic in 
Canada. The government has committed over $1 billion during this time to improve the 
public health system.164  An additional $100 million was also invested to fund local 
public health activities further.  Progress continues in rebuilding and sustaining a stronger 
public health system in Canada.  The commitment of resources continues in the areas of 
collaboration and networks, emergency preparedness, infectious disease surveillance, and 
laboratory capacity.   
A key accomplishment was the establishment of the PHAC and appointment of 
the country’s first CPHO.  This agency has made progress in rebuilding the public health 
system in Canada.  A few examples follow.  
1. Collaboration and Networks 
The Canadian Public Health Network provides a forum for all levels of 
government to participate in policy discussions and decision making on key public health 
issues.  PHAC also participates at the international level with the WHO, the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership (SPP), and the Global Health Security Action Group in order to 
advance the public health agenda in Canada.  In addition, Canada is a signatory on the 
updated International Health Regulations (IHR) through the WHO.165  
2. Emergency Preparedness 
Canada’s Pandemic Influenza Plan was revised late in 2006 with input from 
provincial and territorial governments.  The plan outlines roles and responsibilities for all 
levels of government and sets out command and control structures and authorities for 
responding to public health emergencies.  Multidisciplinary Health Emergency Response 
Teams are prepared to be deployed across the country to provide medical surge capacity.   
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In addition, the country has stockpiled antiviral drugs and has secured a domestic vaccine 
supplier.  As well, infection control practice guidelines for hospitals and other health care 
settings have been updated and distributed.166 
The Public Health Agency of Canada Act167 was given Royal Assent on 
December 12, 2006, bringing into force and providing the statutory basis for the PHAC 
and the position and duties of the CPHO.168  The Act reaffirms the federal government’s 
commitment to public health.  The Minister of Health, the Honorable Tony Clement was 
quoted as saying, “It underscores the important role that the Public Health Agency of 
Canada and the Chief Public Health Officer play in strengthening our public health 
system.  We will continue our collaboration with provinces, territories and stakeholders 
to address public health issues and prepare for public health emergencies.”169 
This legislation establishes the PHAC as a separate entity and provides regulatory 
making authority for the collection, analysis, interpretation, publication, and distribution 
of public health information.  It outlines jurisdictional responsibilities over public health 
and legal authorities, and implements many health policy recommendations outlined by 
the National Advisory Committee on SARS (Naylor Report) “Learning from SARS – 
Renewal of Public Health in Canada,” October 2003.   
3. Infectious Disease Surveillance and Response 
The Global Public Health Intelligence Network, designed to track media stories in 
multiple languages to monitor and identify potential emerging public health threats 
around the world, continues to be enhanced.  PHAC has developed and implemented the 
Canadian Network for Public Health Intelligence (CNPHI) that has the capability of 
gathering information from pharmacy sales, emergency room visits, and from other 
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surveillance systems.  This information is analyzed and the system has the capability to 
issue alerts when significant trends emerge.  In addition, a Canadian Integrated Outbreak 
Surveillance Centre (CIOSC) has been developed that provides internet-based alerting 
capability to share public health information quickly across the country.170   
In December 2006, a new Quarantine Act was implemented that strengthens the 
capacity of the government to reduce and prevent the spread of infectious disease from ill 
travelers entering and departing Canada.  Airports in Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, 
Calgary, and Vancouver have implemented quarantine provisions.  Approximately 95 
percent of the international air travelers arrive and depart Canada from these airports. 
4. Laboratory Capacity 
On March 24, 2003, international collaboration among laboratories isolated the 
new coronavirus from a SARS patient.  Between April 8 and April 10, scientists found 
positive antibody titers to SARS-CoV in a high percentage of SARS patients and none in 
control patients.  On April 16, the WHO announced that this coronavirus, previously 
never seen in humans, was the cause of SARS.  The speed with which the virus was 
identified that caused SARS was made possible by the collaboration of ten countries, 
including Canada.  However, this occurred more than one month after the start of the 
SARS outbreak in Ontario.171 
The National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) has increased capacity to respond 
to outbreaks by enhancing virus sequencing technology and vaccine research.  In 
addition, NML’s mobile laboratory capacity has been expanded, increasing its capability 
to respond to the site of an outbreak domestically and internationally.  Most notable is the 
construction of high tech operations at NML to handle scientific information such as 
DNA fingerprints and to manage the flow of laboratory information while being 
networked with other laboratories.172   
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Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases are a permanent fixture on the 
public health landscape at the local, state, national, and international levels.  People will 
continue to travel and migrate, goods will continue to be traded, and the convergence of 
microbes and humans will continue to occur, posing a “universal” threat to public health 
security.  Further compounding this challenge is the threat of accidental or intentional 
release of biological agents.  In order to mitigate the threat of nature and the incidence 
and effects of infectious diseases, a strong, robust, sustainable public health system is 
needed at all levels of government.  This is reinforced by the following quote from the 
SARS Commission Report.  
Why was Ontario so unprepared for SARS?  Our public health and 
emergency infrastructures were in a sorry state of decay, starved for 
resources by governments of all three political parties.  The health 
system’s capacity to protect its workers was in a state of neglect: what 
little existed was badly malnourished.  There was no system in place to 
prevent SARS or to stop it in its tracks.  The only thing that saved us from 
a worse disaster was the courage and sacrifice and personal initiative of 
those who stepped up the nurses, the doctors, the paramedics and all the 
others sometimes at great personal risk, to get us through a crisis that 
never should have happened.  Underlying all their work was the 
magnificent response of the public at large: patient, cooperative, 
supportive.173  
Typical with emerging infectious diseases like SARS, no effective drugs, 
vaccines, or natural immunity exist to combat them.  The key to controlling SARS and 
other novel infectious diseases is traditional public health prevention and control 
strategies such as case identification, contacting tracing, and containment strategies.  
These may include isolation, quarantine, and infection control.  These types of measures 
proved effective and were associated with slowing and eventually controlling the spread 
of SARS.  As Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881) remarked when introducing his Public  
 
 
                                                 
173 The SARS Commission, Volume 1, Executive Summary - Spring of Fear, 2-3. 
84 
 
Health Act to British Parliament in 1875, “public health is the foundation for the 
happiness of the people and the power of the country.  The care of the public health is the 
first duty of statesmen.”174   
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VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CANADIAN AND U.S. 
PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS 
Given today’s universal vulnerability to the threat of infectious disease spread and 
the threat from a weaponized biological agent, it is appropriate and timely to compare the 
Canadian public health system’s lessons learned during SARS to the current U.S. public 
health system’s capacity and capability.  There is no national public health system or 
accepted set of national public health preparedness standards that provide a foundation 
toward ensuring the U.S. public health system is prepared to prevent, mitigate, or respond 
to disease epidemics, another pandemic, or a bioterrorist attack.  However, by evaluating 
the lessons learned from SARS in Canada and comparing these lessons to current public 
health capacity and capability in the United States, recommendations for system 
improvement will be made.  The result is to identify a way forward in ensuring adequate 
capacity, capability, and better public health system preparedness in the United States. 
A. GOVERNMENTAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR 
PUBLIC HEALTH  
1. Canada 
As a federation, Canada operates on three levels—federal, provincial, and 
municipal (local)—and is divided into thirteen provinces and three territories.  Refer to 
Figure 7 for a map of Canadian provinces and territories.  Ontario was the province hit 
hardest by SARS.  The federal role in public health is limited constitutionally; thus, 
restricting the country’s national and international coordination efforts during a public 
health emergency.  The federal government does have the authority to legislate some 
aspects of public health including quarantine provisions, national borders, and trade and 
commerce.  Health Canada was the federal department responsible for public health and 
the majority of the federal response activity occurred at the Public Health Branch during 
SARS.175   
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Ten provinces and three 
territories
1. Prince Edward Island
2. Nova Scotia
3. New Brunswick











Adapted from www.comeexplorecanada.com/canada/ (accessed July 19, 2008).
 
Figure 7.   Canadian Provinces and Territories 
Public health is primarily a provincial responsibility, though revenue generation 
and spending capacity is concentrated at the federal level.  Earmarked revenue transfers 
to other governments are limited; instead, grants and contributions are directed to non-
profit and non-governmental organizations.176  Medical care is provided through 
universal health insurance plans administered by each province.  Hospitals rely on public 
grants, and physicians work primarily as private fee-for-service contractors.  Public 
health units are partially funded by municipalities, and thus, also work semi-
autonomously. 
Most provincial and territorial levels of government have a chief medical officer; 
however, the reporting relationships to the federal government vary considerably.  In 
addition, each province has public health workers engaged in planning and providing 
technical assistance and consultation to local units.  Like the chief medical officer, 
capacity at this level varies greatly from one province to the next.  There are basically  
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four patterns of governance of local public health services in Canada: including regional 
health authorities, regional boards, quasi-municipal or county systems, and provincial 
models.177  
In the Province of Ontario, the pattern of governance is the quasi-municipal.  The 
Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care (OMHLTC) provides minimum 
requirements for core public health programs and services that include disease prevention 
and health protection.  Local health units have the responsibility to conduct surveillance, 
case-finding, contact tracing, immunization, infection control, and risk assessment.  Local 
health units are also required to report infectious diseases to the Ontario Ministry of 
Health and Long Term Care.  During the SARS outbreak, Ontario declared SARS a 
reportable disease, which allowed local officials to issue prevention and control measure 
orders such as isolation and quarantine.178   
A challenge is that primary legislative power rests with the provinces and 
territories, but service delivery remains on the frontlines with local public health units.  In 
Ontario, local boards of health are responsible for public health and serve either single or 
multiple municipalities and counties.  Boards are appointed by the municipalities and 
provinces.  In larger cities, the board may be a part of a city council.  These local units 
have their own governance, but their activities are constrained by provincial law, 
regulations, policies, and conditions of funding.179 
Today there is a Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) headed by a chief 
public health officer (CPHO) based in Winnipeg with regional offices and Centres across 
Canada for infectious and chronic disease, emergency preparedness, surveillance, and 
healthy human development.  In addition, the agency oversees the National Microbiology  
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Laboratory (NML) and the Laboratory for Foodborne Zoonoses (LFZ).180  If SARS were 
to reemerge, the new PHAC would lead the federal response in coordination with Health 




















Public Health Practice and 
Regional Operations
Branch
Adapted from PHAC, Sustainable Development Strategy 2007-2010, Sustainable Development in Public Health, A 
long term journey begins www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/sds-sdd/sds-sdd2-a_e.html (accessed July 7, 2008).
 
Figure 8.   PHAC Table of Organization 
The Infectious Disease and Emergency Preparedness Branch (IDEP) focuses on 
the prevention and control of infectious diseases with staff prepared to respond to public 
health emergencies.  Two centres make up the branch including the Centre for Infectious 
Disease Prevention and Control and the Centre for Emergency Preparedness and 
Response.  The NML and the LFZ are also located in this branch along with the 
Pandemic Preparedness Secretariat.181 Although all branches in the PHAC have 
responsibilities in preparedness, the IDEP branch plays a critical role in plan  
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development, emergency response, providing guidance for provinces and municipalities 
on infectious disease prevention and control and providing public health laboratory 
services.  
National and international leadership in health promotion, chronic disease 
prevention and control is provided by the Health Promotion and Chronic Disease 
Prevention Branch.  This includes surveillance of chronic diseases and risk factors with a 
focus on special populations.  Three centres are located in this branch and include the 
Centre for Chronic Disease Prevention and Control, the Centre for Health Promotion, and 
the World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Centre on Chronic Disease 
Policy.182 
Responsibility for building the regional capacity of the PHAC and for providing 
strategic direction in public health surveillance rests with the director general of the 
regions in the Public Health Practice and Regional Operations Branch.  This branch 
consists of the Office of Public Health Practice.  PHAC has an office presence in all 
regions of Canada.  Priorities in this branch include improving the public health 
infrastructure, information and knowledge systems, and public health law and 
information policy.183  
The Strategic Policy, Communications and Corporate Services Branch provides 
support across the PHAC’s branches and centres.  Policy direction, partnership 
development, communication plans, strategies, and social marketing activities are 
coordinated by this branch.  Finance and administration is provided along with 
compliance and auditing controls and information technology management.  In addition, 
human resource management and safety services are provided.184   
                                                 





2. United States 
In the United States the constitution gives states primary responsibility for 
providing health services.  The federal government has a limited role in the direct 
delivery of public health services, but provides leadership, has some regulatory authority, 
and contributes financial resources.  Constitutionally, the federal government has the 
responsibility for preventing entry of disease into the United States and for preventing its 
interstate spread.  Federal legislation governs immunization and vaccine purchase, and 
several other nationwide programs.   
The ultimate authority for public health in the United States rests with the 
secretary for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).  This department is 
the lead federal agency for public health under the direction of the secretary.185  The 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) serves as the 
secretary’s primary advisory workforce on bioterrorism and other public health 
emergencies.186  This office is responsible for coordinating interagency activities with 
other federal departments and with state and local officials responsible for preparedness.  
ASPR is comprised of four main offices: the Biomedical Advanced Research and 
Development Authority (BARDA); the Office of Preparedness and Emergency 
Operations (OPEO); the Office of Medicine, Science, and Public Health (OMSPH); and 
the Office of Policy and Strategic Planning (OPSP).  Refer to Figure 9 for a table of 
organization of DHHS. 
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Adapted from Department of Health & Human Services Organizational Chart, www.hhs.gov/about/orgchart.html (accessed July 7, 2008)
 
Figure 9.   DHHS Table of Organization 
The BARDA provides expert advice and coordinates interagency efforts to define 
and prioritize requirements for public health and medical countermeasures, related 
research, and product development and procurement.  In addition, the BARDA is 
responsible for setting deployment procedures for medical countermeasures held in the 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).  The OMSPH is responsible for providing expert 
medical, scientific, and public health advice on domestic and international medical 
preparedness policies, programs, and activities.  This office serves as the ASPR liaison to 
science and health professional organizations on domestic and international issues.187  
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The OPEO is responsible for developing operational plans and participating in 
training and exercises to ensure preparedness of the ASPR and the DHHS.  This includes 
ensuring the ASPR has the logistical and systems support in place to coordinate the 
operational response to acts of terrorism and other public health emergencies.188  Policy 
formulation and coordination for preparedness and response planning is the responsibility 
of the OPSP.  Analysis of proposed policies, presidential directives, and regulations 
occurs in the OPSP office.189       
Another key agency in DHHS which plays a significant role in public health 
preparedness is the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  The CDC is 
recognized by many as an international leader in the areas of surveillance systems, 
databases, outbreak investigation, and communicable disease epidemiology.  The CDC 
provides a national focus on developing and applying disease prevention and control, 
environmental health, health promotion and health education activities designed to 
improve the health of the people of the United States.  Serving as a lead federal public 
health agency, the CDC identifies and defines preventable health problems and maintains 
active surveillance of diseases through epidemiology, laboratory investigations, data 
collection, analysis, and distribution of information.  In addition, the CDC actively 
engages in research, occupational safety, and public health workforce development.  The 
CDC is responsible for controlling the introduction and spread of infectious disease in the 
United States and works collaboratively with other nations and international agencies on 
matters of public health concern.190  
Although responsibility for public health rests primarily with the states 
constitutionally, the degree of commitment to public health by states varies.  A 2005 
study by Leslie M. Beitsch et al., Public Health At Center Stage: New Roles, Old Props, 
portrayed the variability in organization, functions, roles and responsibilities, and 
commitment to and investment in the public health infrastructure in the United States.  
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Collection of information came from two surveys.  One was conducted by the 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officers (ASTHO) with all fifty states 
responding, while the other was conducted by the National Association of City and 
County Health Officials (NACCHO) with 2,298 out of 2,865 local public health agencies 
responding.191   
a. Structure and Governance 
Fifty-eight percent of state public health agencies were freestanding, 
independent agencies and 42 percent were part of an umbrella organization, for example 
human services. The dominant organizational configuration was decentralization at 42 
percent, while centralized organization comprised 26 percent, and mixed or shared at 32 
percent.192  State boards or councils existed in approximately half of the states and 
typically played a major role in public health policy making and regulation.  In a similar 
2001 study by Leslie M. Beitsch et al., Structure and Functions of State Public Health 
Agencies, almost all state public health agencies served as the lead public health 
authority.193   
The state health officer (SHO) was appointed by the governor in 66 
percent of the states, by the secretary of health and human services in 24 percent of the 
states, and by a board of health in 8 percent of the states.  The remaining 2 percent 
included appointments by the governor and secretary.194  The SHO was primarily 
responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the public health agency, for setting policy, 
and for making budget recommendations. 
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At the local level, public health provides services to the community 
through a variety of jurisdictional forms.  County structure is dominant, with nearly six 
out of ten local agencies organized by county jurisdiction.195  Boards of health have a 
major presence with almost 75 percent of all jurisdictions having a local board; however, 
responsibility for governing, policy making, and advising varies.  The local board of 
health, however, only serves as the governing body for approximately 45 percent of the 
local public health agencies.196  County commissions, state health agencies, and city 
councils make up the rest.  There was no correlation between the type of organizational 
structure and population size.197  
b. Programs and Functions 
The ASTHO survey revealed that the breadth and scope of activities that 
state health agencies are engaged in vary widely.  Activities range from disease 
surveillance, to data collection, to environmental regulation to Medicaid administration.  
All public health agencies have preparedness programs; most all have vital statistics data, 
maintain public health laboratories, and have anti-tobacco programs.  Few states, 
however, have direct mental health and Medicaid responsibilities.198   
Likewise, the NACCHO survey showed that local public health agencies 
also perform a wide variety of activities such as, childhood immunizations, 
communicable disease epidemiology, and screening for infectious disease.  In addition, a 
variety of prevention programs are offered, including obesity, tobacco control, and injury 
prevention.  Mental health and primary care are less likely to be offered at the local 
level.199  
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c. Infrastructure and Support 
Data from the ASTHO and NACCHO survey were integrated to examine 
public health agency infrastructure and support.  The mean total per capita state and local 
public health spending for 2004-2005 from federal, state, and local resources was 
$149.200  Spending of local and state public health agencies constituted 2.37 percent of 
all U.S. health spending for 2004 and 2.34 percent for 2005.  Canada, on the other hand, 
invests 5.5 percent of its smaller per capita total health care spending on public health.201  
The primary budget drain in public health in the United States is workforce at the local 
and state level.  On average, local public health agencies employed sixty-six full-time-
equivalent (FTE) workers with a median of sixteen FTEs in 2005.  As expected, the mean 
state public health workforce was greater with a median of 1,924 FTEs.202   
Larger cities in the United States seem to have more robust public health 
infrastructures, though there are thousands of local (county-based) public health agencies 
that may be too small and which lack the critical infrastructure necessary to be effective.  
The first line for outbreak detection and management remains at the local and state level.  
The CDC must be invited to participate or offer support during an outbreak, but once 
invited, plays a significant role in outbreak investigations, consultation, and prevention 
and control. 
The United States has a chain of policies including legislation, national 
goals and priorities, an executive order for a national public health preparedness strategy, 
and program plans directed toward public health preparedness.  There are mechanisms in 
place to network with stakeholders and policy makers regarding funding and 
preparedness activities.   
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3. World Health Organization 
The WHO is the coordinating and directing authority for health in the United 
Nations.203  This includes providing leadership on global health matters, shaping the 
research agenda, setting standards, sharing evidenced-based policies, and providing 
technical assistance and consultation to other countries.  The World Health Assembly is 
the supreme decision making authority for the WHO, and meets annually in Geneva to 
determine and approve resolutions.  Currently, there are delegations representing all 193 
member states of the WHO.204  
The International Health Regulations (IHR) 2005, a legally binding agreement 
with member states, provides the framework for the coordination and management of 
public health incidents that have international concern.  The IHR are the only set of legal 
rules requiring WHO-member states to follow concerning the control of infectious 
diseases with the potential to spread internationally.205  The regulations provide for 
reporting communicable diseases that have the potential for international spread.  In 
addition, the regulations provide acceptable standards and measures that may be applied 
by countries to prevent diseases from spreading and identify norms and standards for 
seaports and airports to prevent the spread of infectious disease vectors by public 
conveyances that land at ports.206  Canada and the United States are member states of the 
WHO. 
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
Emerging infectious diseases such as SARS are increasingly important not only 
because of their potential to become epidemics, but also because they cause social 
instability.  This is true for Canada, the United States, and the rest of the world.  Table 3 
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outlines public health capacity and capability resources utilized in Canada during the 
SARS outbreak in comparison to current resource availability in the United States.  This 
comparative analysis seeks to discover lessons learned that may be applicable in 
improving public health system preparedness in the United States.  
Table 3.   Comparative Analysis of Canada and the United States  
Preparedness   
Authority 1. The Health Promotion and 
Protection Act (1990) was in place. 
2. There was distinct and separate 
governmental leadership for public 
health, health care, and emergency 
services.   
3. Primary legislative power for public 
health rested with provinces and 
territories; however, no clear line of 
authority existed for “who’s in 
charge.” 
4. Public health service delivery was 
primarily a provincial and local level 
responsibility, but capacity and 
capability varied by province and local 
public health unit. 
5. Conflict and confusion was evident 
among different levels of government 
regarding roles and responsibilities. 
6. Most provinces had a chief medical 
officer; however, reporting 
relationships to federal government 
varied. 
7. Public health units across Canada 
were governed by a board of health, 
which is autonomous under the Health 
Promotion and Protection Act. 
8. Most local health units had a 
medical officer who reported to the 
board and who was responsible for 
administering programs.  
9. There were no required set of 
standards for the delivery of public 
health services that included 
preparedness.  
1. The Pandemic All Hazards Preparedness Act 
(2006) is in place.  Additionally, the Public 
Health Service Act has been amended to require 
the Secretary of the DHHS to lead all federal 
public health and medical response activities, 
public health emergencies, and incidents covered 
by the National Response Plan (NRP). 
2. The ultimate authority for public health rests 
with the Secretary of the DHHS. 
3. The U.S. Constitution gives states primary 
responsibility for health. 
4. All states have state health departments that 
are either free standing or which operate as a 
component of a larger department with a health 
commissioner or director and a board of health.  
Most states have a state epidemiologist/medical 
director. 
5. Most local or county public health agencies 
have a director for the agency, and most have a 
local board of health with physician 
involvement.  
6. Direct public health services are primarily 
provided by local health departments.  A few 
state departments provide direct public health 
services. 
7. There are no required set of standards for the 
delivery of public health services that include 
preparedness; however, core functions and 
essential services are described.  The CDC is 
currently working toward accreditation of public 
health agencies.   
Plans 1. Health Canada now provides an 
annual Health Portfolio outlining 
national health goals and performance 
measures; however, there was limited 
emergency preparedness planning prior 
to SARS. 
2. The government has released Health 
Canada’s Preparedness for and 
Response to Respiratory Infections 
Season and the Possible Re-emergence 
of SARS Plan, fall/winter 2003-04. 
1. Comprehensive guidance, emergency plans, 
and protocols. 
2. The NRP was released in December 2004 to 
align all federal coordination structures and 
capabilities into a unified all-discipline and all-
hazards approach to domestic incident 
management. 
3. In January 2008 the National Response 
Framework provided guiding principles to 




3. The PHAC has released a revised 
Pandemic Influenza Plan and Public 
Health Emergency Plan (2006). 
4. The MOHLTC in Ontario has 
released its Emergency Response Plan 
(MERP) version 2 (November 2007).   
4. Since November 2005, the DHHS Pandemic 
Influenza Plan, has served as a blueprint for all 
DHHS pandemic influenza preparedness and 
response activities. 
5. Although there is no national public health 
preparedness strategy, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 21 was released in 
October of 2007, establishing a national strategy 
for public health and medical preparedness. 
Command and 
Control 
1. No incident management system 
was in place at the time of SARS. 
2. MERP 2007 now provides for 
command and control and the use of 
the incident management system and 
an incident management structure. 
1. The National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) has been implemented across the U.S. 
2. Federal funding is tied to achieving NIMS 
compliance. 
Exercises 1. The literature is silent on exercises 
being conducted by public health or 
health care. 
1. Multidiscipline, local, state and federal 
exercises occur regularly and are required for 
federal preparedness funding. 
Communication   
Alerting 1. Alerting was slow and fragmentary, 
although British Columbia did notify 
regional hospitals and public health 
units with a focus on acute care. 
2. Officials initially targeted acute-
care, leaving long-term care facilities 
and general physicians out of the 
information loop. 
1. CDC maintains a 24/7 Health Alert Network 
(HAN) and Epi-X Network connecting with state 
and local public health agencies.  
2. The WHO maintains global alert system but 
did not issue SARS alert until March 2003. 
3. Many states now have public health alerting 




1. Although fragmented initially, 
British Columbia successfully got 
information to clinicians and hospitals 
in timely manner. 
2. Conflicting messages came from 
multiple spokespersons from different 
levels of government and from 
different agencies. 
3. Travel advisories were inconsistent, 
causing confusion. 
4. Multiple spokespersons were used 
during press briefings and conferences. 
1. During SARS, the HAN, Epi-X Network, and 
the Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Network (GORAN) were used, providing 
effective communication to state and local 
partners.  The public was informed. 
2. Officials actively engage media for delivery of 
prevention messages and what to do in the event 
of emergency. 
3. Officials routinely notify state public health 
agencies through HAN of pending “urgent” press 
releases and conferences. 
Capacity   
Public Health 
Infrastructure 
1. There was an underinvestment in 
public health infrastructure, as noted in 
the Campbell, Kirby, Naylor, and 
Walker reports. 
2. The Public Health Branch of the 
OMHLTC was in charge at the 
provincial level when SARS occurred.   
3. There was diminished public health 
leadership that focused on public 
health specifically in infectious disease 
and epidemiology and outbreak 
response.  The focus of the federal 
government had been on primary 
health care versus prevention. 
4. There was weak analytical 
capability among epidemiology staff.  
Epidemiology capacity had to be 
sought from other jurisdictions and 
from other countries. 
1. The DHHS is the principal federal agency for 
protecting the health of all Americans. 
2. The DHHS offers over 300 programs with 
64,750 full-time employees in eleven operating 
divisions, eight agencies in the U.S. Public 
Health Services, and three Human Service 
agencies. 
3. The FY 2008 budget is $707.7 billion. Since 
2002, over $7 billion has been invested annually 
in preparedness for public health and hospitals. 
4. Fifty states have state health agencies. As of 
2005, there were 2,865 local public health 
agencies 
5. The provision of local and state public health 
services varies across the country. 
6. The degree of resource commitment varies 
from state to state and from community to 




5. Approximately $1 billion has now 
been invested in rebuilding public 
health in Canada since SARS. 
6. There are approximately 140 public 
health units in Canada.  Of these, 26 
percent (thirty-six) responded to SARS 
in the Ontario area. 
7. There were varying degrees of 
public health service delivery and 
leadership among public health units. 
7. Many agencies are too small and lack capacity 
to cover needs of the population in their 
jurisdiction.   
8. It is difficult to recruit and retain qualified 
staff in small rural communities. 
9. The Epi-Aid program through CDC allows for 
epidemiology students to work with states during 
outbreaks. 
10. Local and state public health agencies are 
extremely overburdened with traditional and new 
public health responsibilities with little to no 
additional infrastructure support in terms of 
funding and workforce. 
11. In FY 2008 the CDC budget $6.5 billion with 
8,896 full-time employees. 
Surveillance 
Systems 
1. Systems lacked Web-based public 
health communications systems across 
jurisdictions and the ability to link 
patient records and other health care 
data sources. 
2. The weak surveillance system was 
forced to use a paper-based system 
during the SARS response.   
1. A national electronic disease surveillance 
system is currently used with all fifty state health 
agencies reporting; however, reporting to CDC is 
voluntary.   
2. A national influenza-like illness disease 
reporting system in place, which is also 
voluntary.   
3. Multiple other disease reporting systems are 
used by CDC to collect, analyze, and 
disseminate public health information. 
4. Significant challenges exist with multiple 
“silo” data bases from multiple agencies and 
divisions within DHHS.  Databases do not 
interface. 
5. The ability to link to medical records is being 
explored and worked on by various states. 
Surge  1. There was a lack of agreements for 
sharing public health and health care 
personnel across jurisdictions. 
2. Of those affected, 43% were health 
care workers.   
1. The Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact has all 50 states as signatories and 
provides an avenue to share human resources 
across jurisdictions. 
2. The U.S. Public Health Services and CDC 
provide limited human resource surge capacity 
through Epi-Aid. 
3. Some states have specialized response teams 
and volunteers that include medical and public 
health staff. 
Infection Control 1. Policies, procedures and guidance 
were outdated. 
2. The infection control network was 
fragmented, resulting in many 
infection control practitioners across 
the country lacking linkages for 
receiving information regarding SARS. 
3. Infection control in hospitals was 
not a priority program, resulting in 
limited routine disease reporting and 
linkages with public health. 
1. The Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion 
in DHHS functions as part of the National Center 
for Infectious Diseases and provides 
comprehensive guidance, policies, and protocols 
on infection control in health care settings. 
2. Many states participate in infection control 
networks sharing information across agencies. 
3. Infection control is a significant part of each 
hospital’s quality improvement and preparedness 
programs. 
4. Many state health departments provide 
technical assistance and consultation on infection 
control. 
5. The Association of Professionals in Infection 
Control (APIC) provides strong national 





Laboratories 1. SARS testing had to be pushed to 
local hospital labs to function as 
reference laboratories because the 
surge could not handled. 
2. Laboratories were not linked to 
share laboratory and epidemiological 
data with multiple public health units. 
3. Researchers’ rapid response to 
delineating the cause of SARS, 
characterizing the agent, developing 
diagnostics tests and generating initial 
clinical descriptions/definitions was 
good. 
1. The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) 
became operational in 1999.  Collaborative effort 
among CDC, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the Association of Public 
Health Laboratories. 
2. The federal government maintains an 
integrated network of state and local public 
health, federal, military, and international 
laboratories that can respond to bioterrorism, 
chemical terrorism and other public health 
emergencies.  






1. Strong linkages between public 
health and the health care system were 
absent.  
2. There was poor response 
coordination across public health units 
and with other sectors. 
1. There are strong linkages among public health 
agencies at the local, state, and federal levels, 
and among hospitals.  This continues to improve.  
2. An identified weakness is direct linkages with 
individual physicians and the thousands of 
medical and special clinics across the country.  
1. Preparedness 
a. Authority 
In Canada, confusion regarding authority or “who’s in charge” of a public 
health emergency either locally or nationally caused frustration, and at times, delays in 
response to the SARS outbreak.  This may have been caused by the separate and distinct 
management of health care, public health, and general emergency response.  As well, 
conflicts existed among the different levels of government in terms of who was 
responsible for what actions.  Issuance of border controls was inconsistent and passenger 
screenings at airports varied.  During the SARS response, regular conference calls were 
scheduled by the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long Term Care (OMHLTC) for local 
medical officers to share information; however, it was difficult for the local medical 
officers to break away from the response long enough to participate.  Some, on the other 
hand, simply did not participate.  Emergency plans outlining legal authorities and 
identifying roles and responsibilities were not in place at the time of the epidemic. 
Public health service delivery in Canada is the responsibility of local 
public health units; however, primary legislative power rests with the provinces and 
territories.  This contributed to frustrations on the part of local public health workers 
when trying to implement prevention and control measures through the use of public 
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health orders.  There are approximately 140 local health units in Canada, of which thirty-
six reside in Ontario.  Each of these units functions autonomously under the Health 
Promotion and Protection Act and is governed by a board of health.  Varying degrees of 
participation by these boards with the local public health units contributed to some 
confusion regarding roles and responsibilities with different levels of government.   
The Pandemic All Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 requires the 
secretary of DHHS to lead all federal public health and medical responses to public 
health emergencies and incidents covered under the National Response Plan (NRP).207  
Similar to Canada, the U.S. Constitution gives states primary responsibility for public 
health services, which are mostly provided by local public health agencies.  All states 
have state health departments that are either free standing or are part of a larger “super” 
agency with a health commissioner or director.  Unlike Canada, most states have a state 
public health medical director or epidemiologist.  Physician involvement at the local 
level, however, is usually represented by a physician on a local board of health instead of 
being recognized as a medical health officer for the local agency or jurisdiction.  
Prominent in both countries are boards of health at the provincial/state level as well as at 
the local level.   
b. Plans                  
Health Canada develops an annual health portfolio outlining national 
health goals and performance measures.  Prior to SARS, few of these goals focused on 
infectious disease and preparedness.  Specific emergency plans for infectious disease 
outbreaks were limited in Canada prior to the SARS outbreak; however, it was reported 
that a pandemic influenza plan was under development by the OMHLTC.  Without 
integrated emergency plans, Canada experienced difficulty in linking institutional and 
non-institutional clinicians, other response partners, and different levels of government.  
The lack of planning contributed to confusion about the different roles and 
responsibilities among different levels of government, and overall authority for the SARS 
                                                 
207 U.S. Congress, “Pandemic All Hazards Preparedness Act,” 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-3678 (accessed July 19, 2008).  
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response.  A revised Pandemic Influenza Plan was released in 2006 and the OMHLTC 
released version two of the Ministry’s Emergency Response Plan in November 2007.208  
In the United States, comprehensive guidance, emergency plans, 
protocols, and fact sheets are provided by the DHHS.  In December of 2004, the NRP 
was released, followed by the National Response Framework in early in 2008 by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Although there continues to be debate over 
the plans, guidance and direction is provided regarding roles, responsibilities, and 
authorities covering multiple governmental disciplines at the local, state, and federal 
level.  In addition, DHHS has released thorough Pandemic Influenza implementation and 
response plans.  More recently, the president released Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive (HSPD) 21, which established a national strategy for public health and medical 
preparedness in October of last year.209  Plan development and implementation is 
required by DHHS in order to receive cooperative agreement funding allocations for 
public health and medical preparedness at the local and state level. 
c. Command and Control 
An incident command or management structure was not in place in 
Canada at the time of the SARS epidemic.  This was evident given the numerous 
concerns expressed by public health and health care workers about confusion and lack of 
clarity regarding who was in charge during the epidemic.  Since SARS, incident 
command and an incident management structure have been developed and are included in 
both Canada’s pandemic plan and the MOHLTC’s Emergency Response Plan.   
The United States has invested a significant amount of time and effort into 
implementing a National Incident Management System (NIMS).  Emergency 
management, public health, health care, law enforcement, and other disciplines are  
 
                                                 
208 OMHLTC, “Ministry Emergency Response Plan (MERP),” 
http://www.health.go.on.ca/english/providers/program/emu/emerg_prep/emerg/emerg_resp_plan.pdf 
(accessed July 3, 2008). 
209 President, Directive, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-21,” 1-9. 
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required to take incident command and incident management training at the local and 
state level.  This requirement is tied to receiving federal funding, and states are required 
to become NIMS compliant.   
d. Exercises 
Review of the literature and emergency plans did not reveal activities 
relating to exercises in Canada.  In the United States, on the other hand, disciplines within 
all levels of government actively participate in exercises ranging from table-top to full-
scale forums.  Exercising, after-action reporting, and improvement planning is a 
requirement for receiving federal funding through cooperative agreements. 
2. Communication 
a. Alerting and Risk Communication  
Reliable and timely alerting and information sharing are critical actions in 
an effective emergency response.  Alerting capability and the capacity to share diverse 
health information with medical practitioners, other response partners, the media, and the 
public are key in establishing trust and credibility.  During SARS, Canada’s alerting was 
fragmented and slow; however, the Province of British Columbia did provide warnings to 
some regional clinicians, hospitals, and public health units through its Centre for Disease 
Control.   
Risk communication was non-existent or was, at best, fragmented in 
Canada during the initial months of the SARS epidemic.  This was in part due to the lack 
of certainty about diagnosis, treatment, and epidemiology during the beginning phases of 
the outbreak.  In Canada, information being provided to the public and health care 
workers was not consistent.  Press briefings often included three to four spokespersons 
without a clear “lead” expert identified.  Travel advisories were issued in Canada; 
however, these advisories were inconsistent.  While the economic impact of these 
advisories were profound, the epidemiological foundation for issuing them was weak.210  
                                                 
210 Naylor et al., “Learning From SARS in Hong Kong and Toronto,” 2485. 
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The CDC maintains and utilizes a Health Alert Network (HAN) to alert 
and distribute routine and emergent public health information.  All states are on the 
system.  This is an efficient and reliable mechanism for alerting and for the sharing of 
public health information.  SARS advisories, updates, and surveillance data were shared 
regularly with local and state public health departments across the nation.  In addition, 
CDC utilizes a system called “Epi-X” that connects state epidemiologists and other 
public health officials.  Near real-time disease outbreak information is shared on a regular 
basis.  This system also has alerting capacity.  State epidemiologists can post and 
contribute information on the system.  Clear direction is provided regarding 
confidentiality.  In addition, CDC often alerts state public health agencies prior to press 
conferences or briefings of an urgent nature to share information and ensure consistent 
public health messages. 
As a result of bioterrorism funding, many states have implemented state 
HANs that function in the same manner as the HAN for CDC.  For example, in Iowa, 
there are over 2,500 users on the system including local and state public health, all 
licensed hospitals, emergency medical services providers, law enforcement, emergency 
management, the governor’s cabinet, hazmat teams, and many others.  Alerting and 
posting information on the portal is selective and secure to ensure confidentiality. 
Openness and transparency among government, health care, and public 
health, as well as with the public, is critical when dealing with public health emergencies.  
Communication within the health care and public health systems, with the media and 
public, and among states, countries, and nations is a cornerstone of effective and efficient 
crisis response and management.  According to C. David Naylor in Learning from SARS 
in Hong Kong and Toronto, this will require collaboration within and across jurisdictions 
“sharing values and goals, trust, goodwill, and agreed-upon rules of engagement.”211  
Ongoing planning efforts and investments in risk communication, public education, and 
technology for information sharing should be a priority in federal, state, and local public 
health agencies. 
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3. Capacity  
a. Public Health Infrastructure and Surge 
At the time of the SARS epidemic, the overall public health capacity, or 
infrastructure, was weak in Canada, and was identified as “critically underdeveloped.”  It 
is evident that the underinvestment in public health infrastructure in Canada contributed 
to many challenges faced in responding to SARS.  This is portrayed in the Campbell, 
Kirby, Naylor, and Walker reports summarized in Chapter V.  Primary health care has 
been the focus in Canada with limited attention given to public health in the area of 
prevention and health protection.  This misguided focus has led to a diminishing pool of 
qualified public health leadership and general workforce.  Well-trained epidemiologists, 
infection control practitioners, public health nurses, and microbiologists were few and far 
between during the SARS outbreak.  Without epidemiologists and others skilled in 
surveillance and outbreak management, response was challenged from the beginning of 
the epidemic.  This gap had to be addressed by bringing public health workers to Ontario 
from other provinces and countries.   
Canada did not have agreements in place for sharing public health and 
health care personnel across jurisdictional lines, further compounding the problem.  This 
proved to be a significant surge capacity challenge during the response.  Unlike Canada, 
all fifty states in the United States are signatories of an Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact that allows for the sharing of personnel across jurisdictional 
boundaries.  In addition, a number of states have specialized response teams. For 
example, medical, environmental, and epidemiology staff can be deployed to address 
surge capacity in other states.  There are also federal level response teams, and the U.S. 
Public Health Service has specialists who can be deployed to states when requested. 
In the United States, the CDC alone has 8,896 full-time employees and an 
annual budget of $6.5 billion (2008).212  In the last six years, the United States has 
                                                 
212 CDC, “HHS What We Do: The Department of Health and Human Services,” 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo/html/ (accessed July 19, 2008).  
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invested over $7 billion in preparedness for public health and hospitals.213  All fifty states 
in the United States have public health departments and there over 3,000 local public 
health agencies for a population of 300 million.  The Canadian government, on the other 
hand, has only invested approximately $1 billion in public health since the SARS 
epidemic.  Ontario alone has thirty-six local public health units for a population of 12.8 
million (2008) based on the Ontario Population Projections by the Ministry of Finance. 
Although there is a significant difference in funding levels between 
Canada and the United States for general public health and preparedness, both countries 
experience varying degrees of public health service delivery at the state or provincial and 
local level.  This is primarily due to the “mixed” approach of governance and funding.  
Some communities invest more than others, and thus, leave the citizenry without 
assurance of basic public health service capacity.   
Disease detection, outbreak response, and containment are the primary 
responsibility of local, state, and provincial public health agencies.  Many local public 
health agencies in the United States and Canada are too small, are understaffed, and do 
not have adequate public health infrastructure to prepare for and respond to infectious 
disease outbreaks.  In addition, many smaller communities find it difficult to recruit and 
retain a qualified public health workforce.  Due to this situation, state or provincial public 
health agencies are called upon to provide frontline disease investigation leadership and 
epidemiological support.  For example, in Iowa, there are six regional field 
epidemiologists—one for every 500,000 individuals spanning ninety-nine counties.  
Given an outbreak such as SARS, the capacity of six epidemiologists would not come 
close to providing the necessary investigatory leadership and workforce support that 
would be needed for a citizenry of 3 million.   
Given the decay of public health over the past several decades in both 
countries, it should come as no surprise that the public health infrastructure does not have 
the capacity to address the full spectrum of its mission—protecting and promoting health 
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and preventing disease.  Funding formulas and transfers cannot ignore the need for a 
wide breadth of public health service delivery.214  The public health infrastructure prior 
to September 11 and the SARS epidemic was fragile and the breadth and importance of 
new preparedness responsibilities has overburdened the system even more.  Investment in 
and sustainability of public health systems in both countries must be commensurate with 
the magnitude of traditional and new responsibilities entrusted to these systems and the 
workforce that save lives.  
b. Surveillance Systems 
The CDC is a leader in disease surveillance, outbreak investigation, and 
communicable disease epidemiology.215  The CDC provides strong leadership in 
preparing for and responding to infectious disease.  Currently, a national electronic 
disease surveillance system is used for reportable disease, though reporting is voluntary.  
There is no legislative mandate requiring states to report.  The CDC also manages an 
influenza disease reporting system; again reporting by states is voluntary.  There are 
many disease reporting systems used by the CDC, primarily disease-specific systems.  
One challenge is that there are multiple reporting systems that do not interface with one 
another, requiring many programs to report in different ways without the capability of 
integrating information across programs.  The capability to link public health and medical 
records is being debated across the country and some states are making progress, though 
current capability remains weak for the most part. 
Canada’s surveillance system responded poorly and there was no internet-
based communication system connecting jurisdictions and linking public health records 
during SARS.  It should be noted that China had a stronger routine surveillance system 
than Canada because of previous work related to avian influenza that was quickly 
enhanced and used for the SARS outbreak.  This allowed China immediately to begin 
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conducting active research during the outbreak.  Canada did not have the capacity to link 
and share epidemiological data among laboratories, public health, and health care. 
c. Infection Control 
The impact of SARS on health care workers was significant.  As 
previously stated, in Hong Kong alone, 22 percent of all persons affected were health 
care workers, and in Toronto, the proportion of health care workers affected was even 
higher at 43 percent.216  The spread of infection to a large number of health care workers 
added to the stress that Canada faced in responding to SARS.  Policies, procedures, and 
infection control guidance was outdated, though an informal infection control network 
did allow some practitioners to receive information on SARS.  Infection control programs 
in hospitals were not considered a priority.  Likewise, there was limited involvement by 
hospitals participating in routine infectious disease surveillance, leaving a significant gap 
in relationships with public health.  Straightforward guidelines and policies on infection 
control protection measures against droplet and contact transmission were needed. 
In the United States, the Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion in 
DHHS functions as part of the National Center for Infectious Diseases and provides 
comprehensive guidance on infection control in health care settings.  Many state public 
health agencies support and participate in infection control networks, bringing together 
practitioners from diverse health care settings to share information.  Additionally, many 
state public health agencies provide technical assistance and consultation in infection 
control and include these practitioners on health alerting systems.  The Association of 
Professionals in Infection Control provides strong national leadership in the prevention 
and control of infections.  Infection control is a significant part of most hospital quality 
improvement and preparedness programs. 
                                                 




China was able to establish laboratory capacity for testing and sharing 
information through an electronic E-SARS laboratory network while at the same time 
integrating and sharing epidemiological data.  This proved critical in delineating the 
cause of SARS, characterizing the virus, and developing diagnostic tests and generating 
initial clinical definitions.  Canada, however, had limited laboratory capacity, which 
required “pushing” SARS testing to local hospital laboratories because the country’s 
reference laboratories could not handle the surge of test requests.  Canada is now in the 
process of improving this capacity. 
In the United States, the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) became 
operational in 1999 providing a collaborative effort involving the CDC, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the Association of Public Health Laboratories.217  The LRN 
maintains an integrated network of federal, state, and local public health, military, and 
international laboratories that can respond to terrorism and other public health 
emergencies.  The strength of laboratory capacity to quickly share information and link 
epidemiological data is critical for prevention and control.  A key success in stopping the 
SARS outbreak can be attributed to the rapid response of researchers in developing 
diagnostic tests and generating clinical descriptions of the disease.  Without capacity and 
capability to share epidemiological and laboratory information, this would not have been 
possible. 
4. Coordination  
a. Linkages 
It is not surprising that linkages between public health and health care 
were weak in Canada, given the lack of specified authority, emergency plans, and 
communication systems.  It was also evident in Canada that poor coordination existed 
among public health units.  Hospital workers became frustrated by being contacted 
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multiple times regarding SARS case information that had already been reported to other 
units.  Likewise, physicians were frustrated by conflicting information and an overall lack 
of information being provided regarding SARS case definitions.  This was in part due to 
Health Canada initially not accepting the WHO’s case definitions.  In addition, when 
SARS initially appeared, the focus on providing information to acute health care settings 
only left a void in connecting with general physicians and practitioners in the non-acute 
care settings.  There were also varying degrees of collaboration between local and 
provincial medical health officers.   
Linkages are strong among federal, state, and local public health agencies 
in the United States with policy, guidance, and protocol direction.  As well, most state 
and local public health agencies have strong connections with each other and with 
hospitals.  These linkages are constantly being nurtured.  An area that could be improved 
is the direct linkages with individual health care providers in agencies outside the hospital 
setting.  Local public health agencies connect with these providers on a regular basis, but 
there is no universal mechanism in place to ensure these providers receive timely public 
health information. 
C. SUMMARY 
Public health in the United States and Canada has a wide variety of health soldiers 
playing key roles in the prevention and control of infectious disease.  It also represents an 
expansive network of agencies and boards at all levels of government with varying 
degrees of leadership, authority, responsibility, capacity, and capability to prepare for and 
respond to public health emergencies.  These agencies are a product of federalism, with 
authorities resting with governors and ministers at the state and provincial level and with 
boards of health or medical officers at the local level.  It is these authorities that direct 
state and local public health agencies, not national plans, grant guidance, or presidential 
directives.  The result in the United States, for example, is fifty different plans for 
responding to public health emergencies. As well, different levels of disparities in public 




this core problem in a report to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions, Subcommittee on Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness (September 
2005).   
We are attempting to build a platform of national public health 
preparedness to address global health threats on a system constitutionally 
organized at the state level, comprising vastly heterogeneous abilities at 
the local level.  This approach is inherently flawed and by its design will 
ensure frustration and failure.218   
In addition, there are no nationally accepted standards for public health 
preparedness.  Likewise, there are no nationally accepted standards for public health 
service delivery in general.  Both countries face similar challenges with policy makers to 
strike a reasonable balance between public health and health care funding. 
The United States has a number of public health preparedness strengths over 
Canada, including comprehensive plans, incident management structures, alerting and 
surveillance systems, and infection control practices in health care settings.  Canada, on 
the other hand, fell short in these areas during the SARS epidemic.  In the United States, 
the CDC is seen as an international leader in the areas of surveillance systems, databases, 
outbreak investigation, and communicable disease epidemiology, although the same 
cannot be said for local and state public health agencies.  The same weaknesses are seen 
in Canada at the provincial and municipal level.  Given the fact that responsibility for 
public health rests with the states or provinces and direct services are provided by both 
local and state public health agencies underscores the need for a stronger public health 
system at these levels while sustaining the momentum of federal agencies like the PHAC 
and the CDC, and internationally by the WHO.  An epidemiological fact is that the health 
of every nation depends upon the health of all others.219   
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Chapter VII provides a summary of findings from this research, outlines 
conclusions drawn, and provides recommendations for improvement in preparedness by 
the U.S. public health system. 
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VII. IMPROVING U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH  
SYSTEM PREPAREDNESS 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Public health is a critical component of homeland security.  Emerging or re-
emerging infectious diseases—whether naturally occurring or intentionally introduced—
pose one of the greatest threats to the security of the United States.  Governmental public 
health is under unprecedented scrutiny given its new mission of health security.  This 
expanded mission has placed significant demands on the system’s capacity and 
capabilities and has revealed that the system is fragile from years of political neglect, is 
underfunded, and is overburdened.  In its current state, this system cannot meet the full 
range of roles and responsibilities entrusted to it. 
The response to the SARS epidemic in Canada clearly demonstrates the need for a 
robust and sustainable public health system at all levels of government.  It is clear that the 
public health system in every nation needs to be prepared not only for the scope and scale 
of threats and attacks previously experienced, but also those looming in the future.  At the 
same time, this system must continue to address its current mission of health promotion 
and chronic disease prevention.  It is critical for the United States to devise long-term and 
sustainable strategic solutions for revitalizing and bolstering public health defenses and 
avoid the “piecemeal” fixes of the past.220  The public and policy makers at the local, 
state, and federal levels must recognize the need for heightened attention, dedication, and 
commitment to the nation’s public health system.   
SARS was a “live” dress rehearsal for a more serious threat posed by infectious 
disease.  The challenges and stresses that the Canadian public health system and medical 
workers experienced during SARS must serve as the final warning that even some of the 
most advanced countries in the world will find it difficult to cope with similar or more 
dangerous infectious disease epidemics.  SARS placed enormous pressures on the public 
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health and medical systems in terms of information sharing, investigations, contact 
tracing and follow-up, quarantine, isolation, infection control, and long periods of 
intensive medical care services.  The very infrastructure designed to prevent illness, 
control disease spread, and care for and treat those who became ill was attacked.  This 
novel virus nearly crippled the system designed to protect the public’s health and created 
severe economic and social instability.   
Public health agencies in the United States were established almost two centuries 
ago to address community needs such as collecting vital statistics, providing preventive 
health services, and promoting healthy lifestyles.  The system was not designed to fill a 
critical national security mission associated with deliberate acts of biological terrorism or 
future pandemics.  Public health has been organized to serve the health of populations, 
not to serve in a coordinated, systematic, command and control framework responding to 
an epidemic or pandemic producing large numbers of casualties.221  Nor was there a 
vision that the public health system would be responsible for the coordination of public 
health security for the entire nation.  Elin A. Gursky, in a report to the Subcommittee on 
Bioterrorism and Public Health Preparedness, Senate Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor, and Pensions in September of 2005, had this to say about national public health 
security in the United States.   
National public health security cannot be built on a foundation of 
fragmented public health capacities and capabilities any more that our 
military could be effectively organized as thousands of independent local 
militias.222  
The United States was fortunate that SARS did not attack our public health 
infrastructure and that there were only a few cases and no deaths; however, many similar 
system vulnerabilities exposed in Canada’s public health system do exist in the United 
States today.  By falling short again in not acting, the U.S. government (at all levels) will  
 
 
                                                 




fail in protecting the public’s health against the next novel infectious disease or 
bioterrorist attack.  Protecting Americans against infectious disease is a governmental 
responsibility entrusted to public health.  This trust cannot be broken.  
As a product of federalism, similar to Canada, the U.S. public health system 
consists of thousands of local public health agencies, fifty state agencies, and 
approximately twenty-six federal agencies that hold some form of authority and 
responsibility for public health security.  The degree to which these responsibilities are 
met vary from community to community, state to state, and from federal agency to 
federal agency.  All act independently under varying levels of authority held by 
secretaries, governors, state health officers, and boards of health.  This created the 
foundation and organizational structure upon which the U.S. public health system was 
built and currently exists.  This foundation and organizational structure does not support 
public health’s traditional or new homeland security mission. 
Sustainable improvements in the U.S. public health system cannot be realized by 
short term influxes of funding to achieve national public health security.  Preparedness 
for and responding to epidemics or bioterrorism and providing national public health 
security requires making strategic investments in revitalizing and modernizing the public 
health system and maintaining it to meet the public health threats of the twenty-first 
century.  
In order to revitalize and modernize the U.S. public health system, two critical 
component areas must be addressed: 1) organizational capacity and 2) service delivery.  
Based on lessons learned in Canada and uncovering similar vulnerabilities in the United 
States, it is important to ensure organizational capacity—such as governance, 
administration, communication, information technology, and workforce—in order to 
deliver public health services effectively.  Likewise, every American should expect a 
basic level of public health service delivery that includes: 1) health promotion and 
chronic disease prevention, 2) prevention of the spread of disease and epidemics, 3) 
injury prevention , 4) protecting against environmental hazards, and 5) responding to and 
recovering from public health threats and disasters.  These basic services address the 
116 
 
traditional and the new missions of public health.  Organizational capacity and service 
delivery must form the foundation for revitalizing and modernizing the current system 
into a national public health system. 
Randall J. Larsen, retired U.S. Air Force colonel and author of Our Own Worst 
Enemy (2007) echoes this sentiment by saying, “I can tell you that a national public 
health system in the twenty-first century will be as important to national security as the 
Department of Defense was in the twentieth century.”223  
This will be an expensive and time-consuming venture; however, it is a critical 
investment that must be made to achieve national public health security and ensure 
national survival.  Revitalizing and modernizing the U.S. public health system into a 
national system will advance its new homeland security mission and will result in and 
support breakthroughs in the prevention and treatment of a wide range of diseases and 
other health risks that may not reach the level of an epidemic but have the potential to 
affect the health of millions of Americans.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The way forward is twofold.  First, at the national level, the president must 
convene a national commission to be led by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and 
comprised of members of the public health, medical, and academic communities, leaders 
and experts from local, state, and federal agencies, and representatives from the private 
sector.  The IOM needs to lead this commission because it functions outside the 
framework of government, ensuring scientifically informed analysis and independent 
guidance.  The charge of this commission will be to formulate and present a report to 
Congress within eighteen months to establish a national public health system with the 
capacity and capability to meet the traditional and new missions of public health in the 
United States.  The following are recommended at the federal level: 
 
                                                 
223 Randall J. Larsen, Our Own Worst Enemy (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2007), 107. 
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• Identify and recommend an organizational framework (under a single 
authority) for a national public health system.  This must encompass a 
critical review of the federal agencies with responsibilities for public 
health and must include authorities, organizational structure, and capacity 
and capability for service delivery.  In addition, there must be a critical 
review of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
including authorities, organizational structure, and capacity and capability 
necessary to serve as the lead federal agency for a national system.  The 
intent of this review is to capitalize on existing strengths of this agency 
and to formulate recommendations for elevating this agency to function in 
this leadership role or to recommend an alternate approach. 
• As occurred in Canada, review and determine the authorities and 
credentials for a national public health medical director (physician) who 
has extensive experience in public health practice.  This position must be 
created and serve as the “credible” public health voice for the federal 
government during routine and crisis situations.  This position must also 
have the authority to base recommendations and decisions on science and 
not be held hostage by political influences.  The review must include 
physician positions in the federal government having responsibility for 
public health, the position of the surgeon general, and other physician 
positions within the DHHS.  The intent of this review is to formulate 
recommendations for the overall medical direction for the lead public 
health agency for routine programs, during emergency response, and for 
the national system.  In addition, the commission needs to identify 
leadership roles and responsibilities for collaborating with state public 
health medical directors and epidemiologists. 
• Establish a national board of health, identifying authorities for setting and 
promulgating federal and national health policy.  This shall include 
establishing the process for board member appointments and outlining 
credential requirements.  In addition, the commission needs to identify 
leadership roles and responsibilities for information sharing and 
collaboration with state and local boards of health.  
• Define roles and responsibilities that will encompass the traditional and 
new mission for governmental public health (local, state, and federal 
public health agencies, local and state boards of health, and the new 
national board of health) framed under the auspices of national 
accreditation standards that will need to be met by all governmental public 
health agencies and boards.  The commission should review the work 
currently being done at the national level by the Public Health 
Accreditation Board (PHAB) for state and local agencies.  Standards must 
be developed and applied to federal public health agencies and the lead 
federal public health agency for the national public health system.   
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• Secure and maintain funding commensurate with meeting the traditional 
and new mission of public health.  The commission must study and 
formulate recommendations for a national per capita investment for 
governmental public health capacity and service delivery.  This should 
include contributions from local, state, and federal governments.  No 
single level of government can be responsible for this investment alone; 
rather, a shared commitment for governmental public health funding is 
critical.  In formulating this investment rate, the commission must also 
identify an equitable distribution of funds based on clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities, capacity and service delivery for each level of 
government. 
The second way forward rests at the state level.  States must not sit idle and wait 
for the federal government to act; they must move forward in addressing organizational 
capacity and service delivery in meeting both critical missions.  The following are 
recommendations for state health officers: 
• Align and prepare for governmental public health accreditation.  Develop 
state accreditation standards for governmental public health organizational 
capacity and service delivery, monitoring closely and integrating the work 
of the PHAB as appropriate.  Ensure the standards are inclusive of state 
and local governmental public health agencies and boards. 
• Launch an initiative between local and state governmental public health 
agencies and boards to assess organizational capacity and service delivery 
and develop recommendations for shaping and modernizing the 
governmental public health system.  The focus must be on increasing 
system capacity, improving equitable service delivery, enhancing system 
performance, establishing a mechanism to measure process and health 
outcomes, and assuring the public of a basic level of public health service 
delivery in every community.  This work must be based on accreditation 
standards.   
• Provide the necessary leadership in establishing or enhancing the 
authorities, and active engagement of local boards of health with the state 
board of health.  This needs to include relationship building between the 
state public health medical director and local public health medical 
directors and the physicians on boards of health.  In addition, similar to the 
recommendation for a national public health medical director, the state 
public health medical director must serve as the “credible” public health 
voice for state government during routine and crisis situations and have 




• Develop and implement a legislative strategy to promulgate a 
governmental public health system modernization act that provides 
authority, support, and sustainability for organizational capacity and 
service delivery.  At a minimum, the act must include legislative findings 
and intent, definitions, lead agency responsibilities, and organizational 
capacity and service delivery components of the system.  In addition, a 
council to advise the lead agency on system development and 
accreditation, an evaluation committee to evaluate system effectiveness 
and the accreditation process needs to be included.  As well, data 
collection and information sharing authority must be addressed and 
establishment of a governmental public health system fund and authority 
of the state board of health to adopt rules to implement the act are critical. 
• Ensure that the governmental public health system fund is held by the state 
treasury and is managed by the lead state public health agency to assist 
local public health agencies and boards in meeting organizational capacity 
and service delivery in accordance with public health standards.  This fund 
must also support the state health department and board in executing lead 
agency responsibilities. Per capita formularies must be utilized in 
determining the distribution of funds with equitable responsibility for local 
investment.  Funds remaining at the end of a fiscal year should not revert 
to the general fund.              
These recommendations will challenge some in public health who support the 
“business as usual” culture and those who are resistant to accepting the new global public 
health mission of health security.  The issues and challenges associated with public health 
system preparedness in achieving national security have placed public health at a 
crossroads of the traditional and the new.  However, these recommendations provide the 
foundation for addressing both the traditional and new responsibilities entrusted to 
governmental public health in the twenty-first century.  A new paradigm in public health 
is evolving.  It is time to revitalize and modernize the existing system into a national 
system.  This can be done by harnessing the collective force of public health agencies and 
workers across the nation to address both vital public health missions.  This work, if done 
at all levels of government, will lead the way in transforming public health into a national 
system capable of fulfilling its traditional and new missions of promoting the health of 
the population and protecting the health security of this nation.  Organizational capacity 
and service delivery form the foundation upon which the U.S. public health system must 
be transformed into a national public health system.             
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further research is needed to expand upon this work.  Examples include: 
organizational structure of governmental public health at the federal, state and local level; 
additional comparative analysis with public health systems in other countries; and 
examining governmental advisory bodies to determine the level of influence on policy 
development.  Two immediate research questions have emerged as a result of this work.  
They are: 1) What is the cost per capita to provide a basic level of public health service in 
the United States? and 2) What systems and methods should be used to evaluate a 
national accreditation process and the effectiveness of a national public health system that 
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